compound after 6:00pm. Learned counsel noted that there was a cumulative total
of 15 hours of late voting at different polling booths. He also noted the evidence to
the effect that each voter was likely to take not much more than a minute or 2 to
vote. This, said counsel, meant that several hundred persons must have voted
after 6:00pm and all of them could not have been inside the main gate at 6:00pm.
[73]
In my view, the foregoing submissions invite us into the realm of speculation and
surmise. The judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, rejected the evidence of
Pena and Gomez because of discrepancies in their evidence in chief and their
cross-examination, as well as between their evidence and that of other witnesses,
including witnesses for petitioner/respondent Simon, Lovelace Christopher, for
example. There was also the evidence of appellant Spencer’s witness, Phyllis
Proctor. They both testified that the side gate through which Pena and Gomez
said they saw persons coming after 6:00pm to join the line was padlocked and no
one could enter. Additionally, the evidence of the appellant Spencer’s witnesses,
Janice Constant, Itha Anthony, Jason Meade and Jasmine De Silva, was that they
saw no one joining the lines in the St. John’s Rural West constituency. The trial
judge believed their evidence and rejected that of Pena and Gomez. The judge’s
reasoning has not led me to discern anything that suggests that she fell outside of
the ambit of her discretion under the Benmax principles when she found that there
was no voting by persons who joined the lines after 6.00pm to provide cause for
me to interfere with her finding. In the premises, I would have dismissed the
grounds of cross-appeal in the respondents’ counter-notice which challenge this
fact finding by the trial judge even if they had properly pleaded late voting.
[74]
However, there was a preponderance of evidence on which the judge correctly
found that there was late voting (after 6:00pm) by persons who entered the lines in
the 3 contested constituencies before 6:00pm on elections day. Logical sequence
would require that I should now consider whether the learned judge erred when
she held that the late voting did not however breach Rule 1(7) of the Election
Rules. The trial judge’s interpretation of Rule 1(7) impacts this question, but her
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