[160]
The learned trial judge declared the election of the appellants void on the ground
that it was only possible to deduce from the evidence that an indeterminate
number of persons were prevented from voting during the hours of voting time that
were lost. The judge concluded that the effect of the breach caused by the late
opening of the polls on the results in the contested constituencies was not known.
Given this and the number of persons who did not vote in each of these
constituencies, as well as the margins of victory, it was difficult to say definitely
that the results were affected or were not affected by the late start in voting. In
those circumstances the applicable test which the judge used was that which was
applied in Edgell v Glover, and later approved in Considine v Didrichsen.
According to the judge, that test dictates that where the court cannot say that the
result was not affected by a breach, the court must void the election.
The judge’s reasoning
[161]
It would be helpful to set out the reasoning of the trial judge in some detail. She
stated them thus in the Jonas/Quinn-Leandro case:105
“[241] The Court has once again given due consideration to all of the
relevant and admissible evidence that was led in this matter, together with
the very comprehensive submissions of all Learned … Counsel. It bears
noting that all … Counsel referred to the statistics provided and made
several assumptions in urging the Court to find one way or the other that
the results were not affected, or could have been affected. With respect,
the Court has viewed the mathematical tests that were relied upon and
found them very unhelpful. The Court is not persuaded that a proper
approach is to assume that persons did not come out to vote in the
numbers in 2009 as they did in 2004, due to the length of time that the
previous Government was in office, as voiced by Learned Senior Counsel
for the Respondents, as being responsible for the difference in the margin
of victory. Equally, the Court is not persuaded that it can be determined
precisely how many persons were unable to vote as a result of the late
opening of the polls. The Court will not speculate. However, where the
Court has found concrete facts, it is entitled to draw inferences from those
facts. The preponderance of evidence does not indicate that only the
persons who testified were unable to vote. It clearly indicates that others
105
At paragraphs 241-245 of the judgment.
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