John’s Rural West constituency, in breach of rule 1(7) of the Election Rules. [11] At the trial, the respondents to the petitions insisted that late voting was not a triable issue because it was never properly pleaded, or pleaded at all, in the petitions. They argued that the late opening of the polls and the use of the ‘photo lists’ did not breach electoral laws. They argued, additionally, that, in any event, the judge should not have invalidated their return as the elected members in the contested constituencies. This, they said, was because, notwithstanding any breach of electoral laws that might have occurred in the conduct of the elections, there was substantial compliance with the laws. They also contended that any breach that may have occurred did not affect the result of the elections. The High Court judgment [12] The learned trial judge held that late voting was properly pleaded and was therefore a triable issue. She further decided that on a proper construction, Rule 1(7) of the Election Rules required voting to begin at 6:00am and end at 6:00pm. Accordingly, she held that the late opening of the polls in the contested constituencies breached Rule 1(7). She found, as a matter of fact, that there was no voting by any person who allegedly entered the lines in the St. John’s Rural West constituency after 6:00pm. In so doing, the judge rejected the evidence tendered on behalf of the St. George and St. John’s Rural West petitioners that persons joined the line after 6:00pm as not credible evidence. The judge however found, as a matter of fact, that there was late voting in the St. George and St. John’s Rural West constituencies, but only by persons who were in the lines by 6:00pm who were permitted to vote after 6:00pm. She held, however, that Rule 1(7) of the Election Rules, properly construed, permitted persons in line at 6:00pm to vote after 6.00pm. She held that under Rule 1(7), Parliament intended persons who were waiting in line before 6.00pm to be permitted to vote if they had not done so at 6:00pm. In her view, any action to the contrary would have constituted a breach of an elector’s constitutional right under section 40 of the 11