Balancing the Scales of Electoral Justice irregularities in results from Constituencies,86 the IEBC retorted that party agents had become “rowdy and quarrelsome and [had] engaged Commission staff in paralyzing confrontations,” a claim that the agents and observers subsequently denied.87 Consequently, the agents were relocated to another room at the tallying center at the Bomas of Kenya where they were unable to scrutinize the paperwork with details of the tallies. The petitioner termed that a gross illegality. However, the Supreme Court tacitly endorsed the ejection on the ground that IEBC was under obligation to keep order in the tallying center and that, in ejecting the rowdy agents, it acted within its mandate under Article 249 (2)(b) of the Constitution. As the Supreme Court correctly observed, this was a precedent-setting petition in which it needed to provide the baseline for future petitions and jurisprudence.88 Bearing in mind that the disputed Presidential election was the cause of the 2007/2008 post-election violence in the country, this kind of scenario does not augur well for IEBC, the judiciary and the nation at large. Given the security detail at its disposal, in the authors view, IEBC should have controlled the rowdy agents and exercised restraint by allowing them to remain in the tallying hall. Although they gave the 2013 general elections a clean bill of health, most election observers censured IEBC’s opaque tallying and collating of the Presidential votes with the Commonwealth Observer Group describing the exercise as representing “an untidy end of a critical part of the process.89 Quite a number of scholars have since also made more or less similar observations.90 These are the kind of comments IEBC cannot afford to have repeated in future. Every effort should therefore be made to forestall any such eventuality. To accord legitimacy and integrity to the Presidential election and obviate any strife, the national tallying center should not only be accessible to the party and presidential candidates’ agents, but also to the accredited observers and the media representatives and tallying should be open, transparent and verifiable. 86 See Raila Odinga Case [par.35]. 87 See Raila Odinga Case [par. 239]. 88 See Raila Odinga Case [par. 177]. 89 Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), 2013. Some of the other observers were the Election Observer Group (ELOG), the European Union Election Observer Mission (EUEOM) and the Carter Center Election Observer Mission (CCEOM). 90 J Harrington and A Manji (2015) Note 23. 257