2.2.6. INTERNATIONAL NGO STATEMENTS Judges may be dismissed only on serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence, in accordance with fair procedures ensuring objectivity and impartiality set out in the constitution or the law. … A handful of international associations and non-governmental organizations have issued statements and handbooks on judicial independence in domestic judiciaries. Two are:   3. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN PRACTICE: KEY AREAS WHERE INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFERS GUIDANCE The three subsections in this section consider judicial independence in three areas: the constitution of the judiciary (section 3.1); the functioning of the judiciary (section 3.2); and the institutions that support the functions of the judiciary (section 3.3). International law seeks to uphold the components of judicial independence, as set out in the working definition in section 1.1 above, in all three of these contexts. 3.1. CONSTITUTING THE JUDICIARY: BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE The personal independence of judges is protected, in large part, by the mechanisms and procedures for the appointment of judges and the extent to which politicians or private parties are able to influence judicial behaviour after judges are appointed. However, judges who fail to perform their tasks competently, independently or impartially must be accountable for their actions. Judicial independence cannot permit judges to act without any degree of accountability. The rules for the appointment, terms of service, dismissal, discipline and sanction of judges must strike a delicate balance between the need for protecting judges from undue external influence, and the need for judicial accountability. General Comment No. 32 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee sets out this need for balance: States should take specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension and dismissal of the members of the judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken against them. … 26 Approved by the International Association of Judges on 17 November 1999. 27 The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001, adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25-26, 2002. 6 [J]udges must not allow their judgement to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other.28 International Association of Judges, Universal Charter of the Judge;26 and Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices, Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.27 3.1.1. APPOINTMENT The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary note that the mechanisms for judicial appointment must make appointment dependent on integrity and ability and include safeguards against appointment for improper motives.29 The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary do not set out what these appointment mechanisms should be, instead leaving the details to the determination of domestic law.30 Appointment procedures must prohibit discrimination.31 In civil law countries, although judicial appointments are usually made under the career model, appointment to constitutional courts or supreme courts often occurs according to a different mechanism. Because important questions of policy or constitutional interpretation come before constitutional courts and supreme courts, it is widely accepted that political actors should play a role in selecting judges on those courts. The same consideration applies to the selection of judges in supreme courts and lower courts in common law countries, where judicial decisions influence the development of the law. Appointment to constitutional and supreme courts is thus an issue of importance in both civil law and common law countries. The procedures for constitutional court appointments merit careful attention.32 Three common models for constitutional court appointments include the legislative supermajority model (e.g. Germany, where each of the two chambers of the legislature appoint half of the total judges on the Federal Constitutional Court by a two-thirds majority vote), the multiconstituency model (e.g. Turkey, where after constitutional amendments in 2010, the legislature appoints three constitutional court judges and the President appoints the 28 Paras 19-21. Para 10. 30 See also the International Association of Judges, Universal Charter of the Judge, para 9; Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges, para 1(2); African Union Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, principles A(4)(i) and (k). 31 Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LawAsia Region, para 13; Commonwealth Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence, principle II(1). 32 For a detailed treatment of these models, see the forthcoming report on constitutional court appointments by the Center for Constitutional Transitions and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, available at http://constitutionaltransitions.org/. 29