remaining 14; here the executive constituency is overemphasised), and the judicial council model33 (e.g. South Africa’s Judicial Services Commission). The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyer’s Annual Report 2009 notes that appointments procedures dominated by either the legislature or the executive carry risks to judicial independence. Opportunities for legislative and executive domination arise more easily in the legislative supermajority model and the multi-constituency model. The Special Rapporteur therefore recommends the judicial council model be followed, since an independent, corporatist and deliberative body offers the greatest prospect of an independent appointment process.34 The Council of Europe and the African Union concur in this assessment.35 A related issue is the appointment of the Chief Justice. In many countries, the Chief Justice holds specific powers over the judiciary and plays an important administrative role. In some cases, the Chief Justice is appointed through unique procedures that do not apply to the appointment of other judges.36 The Special Rapporteur’s Annual Report 2009 recommends that judges on a specific court elect their own head of court.37 The 2012 Egyptian Constitution provided that the judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court would be appointed on decree by the President, but that ordinary legislation would determine “the judicial or other bodies and associations that nominate them, the manner in which they are to be appointed, and the requirements to be satisfied by them” (Art. 176). This mechanism put some constraint on the President’s discretion to appoint judges, because judicial or other bodies would nominate candidates for appointment. However, leaving important details to ordinary legislation, such as which bodies are to nominate candidates, the manner of appointment and the requirements and qualifications for appointment, creates the risk that the legislature will fail to impose meaningful limits to the President’s discretion to appoint judges. It is preferable for the details of the appointment process to be entrenched in the Constitution itself. Tunisia’s June 2013 draft Constitution proposes a multiconstituency model for appointments to its “recognitionmodel” Constitutional Court (see section 1.4 above). The Tunisian appointment model involves members of the legislature, the executive, and an independent judicial council established under Arts. 109-111. Art. 115 prescribes a twostep appointments process. First, the President, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, the Prime Minister, and the Supreme Judicial Council each nominate six candidates. Second, the legislature’s lower house selects the Court’s judges from the four lists of candidates, selecting three judges from each list of six candidates. Judges must be elected by a three-fifths supermajority of the Chamber of Deputies. This requirement of a legislative supermajority ensures that usually no one political party can control appointments to the Constitutional Court. These measures minimize the risk that a single actor can dominate appointments to the Constitutional Court, and provides safeguards to ensure that candidates who are not independent and impartial, or who are perceived as such, will not be appointed. By contrast, with respect to appointments to its other, “career-model” courts, the June 2013 draft Constitution provides only that “Judges shall be nominated by virtue of an order made by the President of the Republic based on the assent of the Supreme Judicial Council” (Art. 103), and that “A law shall regulate” the mandate, procedures, organization and terms of reference of these courts (Arts. 112, 113 and 114). 3.1.2. SECURITY OF TENURE Security of tenure ensures that judges cannot be dismissed, except in specific circumstances, until the expiry of their term of office. The international law is clear on this point.38 This protects judges from summary dismissal by executives, legislatures, or even a judicial council dissatisfied with particular judges’ decisions.39 In particular, the Special Rapporteur’s Annual Report 2009 raises concerns about short terms of office and regular judicial performance reviews. The Special Rapporteur concludes that short terms of office weaken judicial independence, and that in post-authoritarian transitions term length should gradually be extended so as to progressively introduce life tenure.40 Whether judges are appointed until a mandatory retirement age, or for set terms of office, however, is a matter for the determination of each legal system. The Commonwealth Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence recognize this point, even while they indicate a preference for permanent appointments.41 The African Union Guidelines are clear that security of tenure must be guaranteed for the duration of the term of office, whether this is until a mandatory retirement age or until the expiry of a set term, although appointment under fixed-term contracts is prohibited.42 The 1971 Egyptian Constitution provided only that judges would not be removed from office (Art. 168). The 2012 Egyptian Constitution expanded on these provisions to some extent (Art. 170): 33 See section 3.3.2 for details on judicial councils. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2009, A/HRC/11/41, 24 March 2009, paras 25-28. 35 Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges, para 1(2)(c); African Union Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, principle A(4)(h). 36 See the South African Constitution, Art. 174. 37 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2009, paras 48-50 34 7 38 See generally, DRI and The Carter Center, Strengthening International Law to Support Democratic Government and Genuine Elections (2012), p. 17. 39 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, para 12. 40 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2009, paras 54-55. 41 See para II(1). 42 Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, principles A(4)(l), (m), and (n)(3).