the rights enumerated in the Covenant, while Art. 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides for the “right to simple and prompt recourse” for the violation of rights “recognized by the constitution or the laws of the state concerned or by this Convention.” Neither provision requires that the remedy be provided by a court. In principle, alternative forums for the resolution of legal disputes provide benefits of cost and speed,62 but such alternative forums should (a) not close off routes of access to courts, especially to protect rights, and (b) operate with similar safeguards for independence and impartiality as ordinary courts. 3.2.3. BUDGET The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provide that courts must have adequate resources to properly serve the judicial function.63 The Beijing Statement reiterates the requirement that judges have the “resources necessary” to perform their functions, and emphasizes the principle that executive power “which may affect judges in their office … or their resources, must not be used so as to threaten or bring pressure upon a particular judge or judges.”64 The Commonwealth Latimer House Principles are detailed on this issue, protecting funds, once allocated, from reduction.65 The Special Rapporteur’s Annual Report 2009 recommends that a fixed percentage of national budget be allocated to the judiciary, and the Special Rapporteur has recommended that a baseline of two to six per cent of GDP be devoted to the judiciary.66 Sometimes a fixed percentage of GDP or annual budget is entrenched in the national constitution. For example, Art. 177 of the Constitution of Costa Rica provides: The budget shall allocate to the Judicial Branch an amount of no less than six percent of the ordinary income estimated for the fiscal year. However, when this amount is greater than the sum required to cover the basic needs budgeted by said Branch, said Department shall designate the difference as excess revenue, together with a plan for additional expenditure, in order that the Legislative Assembly may take the appropriate measures. A second issue that concerns the finances of the judiciary goes to how its budget is spent. The management and allocation of the budget is as important a consideration in the judiciary’s independence as the resources it is allocated in the first place. The Special Rapporteur has recommended that judicial independence is best served when the judiciary or an independent body, rather than the executive or legislative branches, is responsible for the judiciary’s budget. 68 3.2.4. CASE ASSIGNMENT The right to a lawful judge is an element of the right to fair trial and the requirements of judicial independence. It requires that the political branches not be empowered or authorized to assign or allocate particular judges to hear particular cases. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary accordingly state that case allocation is a matter to be determined within the walls of the judiciary without any room for interference or intervention from the other branches of government.69 The Special Rapporteur’s Annual Report 2009 extends this principle to include an objective mechanism for allocating cases that safeguards judges from interference from within the judiciary, e.g. the drawing of lots or the use of the alphabetic list of judges. It is possible to imagine that case allocation may be in the hands of a single person within the judiciary, such as the Chief Justice;70 but this may raise concerns when the Chief Justice is appointed through a different process than other judges and may therefore have a closer relationship to the executive.71 Further, the Special Rapporteur has noted that the practices of several countries that allow select senior judges exclusive control over case allocation has led to abuse.72 The Special Rapporteur’s Annual Report 2009 therefore recommends either some form of randomized allocation procedure, or allocation according to a highly detailed management plan based on objective criteria.73 3.2.5. SPECIAL COURTS AND MILITARY TRIBUNALS Art. 172 of the Constitution of El Salvador provides: The Judicial Organ shall have at its disposal an annual allocation of no less than six percent of the current income of the State’s budget. The Beijing Statement addresses the issue of limited resources, indicating that the judiciary’s budget should always occupy a high priority in the allocation of resources.67 Special courts and military courts, as distinct from the ordinary civilian courts, raise special considerations for judicial independence and for democracy. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 32 accepts the existence of special courts, and notes that the ICCPR neither prohibits the existence of special courts nor the trial of civilians in special 68 62 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2008, para 35. 63 Para 7. 64 Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LawAsia Region, paras 38 and 41. 65 Para II(2). 66 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2009, para 37. 67 Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LawAsia Region, para 42. 10 Special Rapporteur’s Mission to Kazakhstan, 2005, E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.2 11 January 2005, para 26. 69 Para 14. 70 See, for example, Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LawAsia Region, para 35. 71 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2009, para 47. 72 Special Rapporteur’s Mission to Kazakhstan, 2005, para 59; Special Rapporteur’s Mission to Russia, 2009, A/HRC/11/41/Add.2, 23 March 2009, para 61; Special Rapporteur’s Mission to Kyrgyzstan, 2005, E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.3, 30 December 2005, para 67. 73 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2009, para 47.