there is no reason that prosecutorial services will not be impartial, even though they are not “independent” of the judiciary as in common law systems. It is important that judges in civil law systems remain independent vis-à-vis the executive, and shielded from improper manipulation or influence by members of the executive. Similarly, the public prosecutors who try the cases before the judge presiding at trial must be impartial. The Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors therefore emphasize that prosecutors be impartial and fair, and make clear the connection between an impartial prosecuting authority and the right to a fair trial before an independent tribunal. This partly inquisitorial character of civil law systems is in contrast to the “adversarial” nature of criminal proceedings in common law countries, where judges are referees between lawyers representing the prosecution and the defence, and at no stage formally direct criminal investigation or participate in decisions to prosecute. It is common in common law systems for the prosecuting authority to be an institution entirely independent of the executive, and thus less susceptible to manipulation or influence from the executive. Prosecuting services can be housed within the executive, but must in these cases be shielded from influence from members of the executive and must continue to operate impartially vis-à-vis the executive. objective factors and decided on in accordance with fair and impartial procedures.86 3.3.2. JUDICIARY COUNCIL A judiciary council is an independent, corporatist body comprised of members of the judiciary, the executive and legislative branches of government, the legal profession and civil society, mandated with the performance of specific tasks related to constituting the judiciary and the functions of the judiciary. These tasks vary, but they usually are taken to include the nomination or appointment of judges, decisions on discipline, dismissal and promotion of judges, and administrative matters related to the internal functions of the courts. The establishment of such a body has been supported by a number of regional soft law instruments, including those issued by the Council of Europe87 and the African Union,88 and the Beijing Statement.89 All of these statements emphasize the need for independence in such a body, and the need for representation, even majority representation, by members of the judiciary on such a body. Roughly 60 per cent of countries have established a judiciary council.90 The Special Rapporteur’s Annual Report 2009 offers a useful summary of the principles to be borne in mind in constituting a judiciary council.91 These can be summarized as follows:  In Tunisia, Art. 112 of the June 2013 draft Constitution provides that the “public prosecution is part of the judicial system”, and that the “judges belonging to the public prosecution shall practice their tasks within the framework of the penal policy of the State according to the procedures established by the law”. The existing procedures established by law in Tunisia, however, allow the executive to exercise a degree of control over public prosecutors. The question that remains is whether Art. 112 provides prosecutorial functions with enough independence from executive interference, by placing them within the judiciary, to ensure that they can function independently vis-à-vis the executive. With respect to the appointment of prosecutors, the Guidelines require that selection criteria must prohibit appointments based on partiality or prejudice, and exclude any discrimination based on a range of grounds including race, colour, sex, religion and political opinion.84 The Guidelines require that the operations and functions of prosecutors be insulated from political interference: States shall ensure that prosecutors are able to perform their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment, improper interference or unjustified exposure to civil, penal or other liability.85    The 1971 Egyptian Constitution provided for a council to administer the common affairs of the judiciary (Art. 173). It was to be composed of the heads of the various courts, but the President was to be its chair. The 2012 Egyptian Constitution did not provide for the establishment of an independent corporatist body or judiciary council, providing instead that ‘[t]he law determines the judicial or other bodies and associations that nominate [judges], the manner in which 86 87 As with judges, prosecutors must enjoy security of tenure, adequate remuneration, and promotion and transfer based on 84 85 Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, para 2(a). Ibid., para 4. 12 The composition of a judiciary council should include legislators, lawyers, academics and civil society, but judges should constitute the majority of its membership; The representation of political representatives should be minimized; The judiciary should have a substantial say in selecting the members of a judiciary council; and The powers of a judiciary council – which could include conducting competitive examinations and interviews for judicial postings, or direct powers to nominate or appoint judges at its discretion – must be carefully set out in law. Ibid., paras 6-7. Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges, para I(2)(c)(i). 88 African Union Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, principle A(4)(h). 89 Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LawAsia Region, para 15. 90 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Appointments and Judicial Independence, United States Institute for Peace, January 2009 (available online at http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/judicial_appointments.pdf)‎, at 4. 91 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2009, paras 28-30.