they are to be appointed, and the requirements to be satisfied by them’ (Art. 176). These provisions do not meet the basic requirements set out in the Special Rapporteur’s Annual Report 2009. With the President as the chair of the body, and with ordinary law setting out the details and requirements of judicial appointment, the risk existed that the President would be able to dominate judicial appointments as well as the operation of the judiciary, thus compromising the independence of the judiciary and the impartiality of judges. The June 2013 draft Constitution of Tunisia establishes a Supreme Judicial Council divided into four separate councils representing the administrative court, financial courts, ordinary courts, and a fourth organizing council (“the judicial councils board”) (Art. 109). The membership of each of the four councils is to be composed half of judges and half of nonjudges. Each council is responsible for the discipline of the judges of the courts it represents, while the Supreme Judicial Council as a whole “shall ensure the judiciary’s sound performance and respect for its independence” (Art. 111). The head of the Supreme Judicial Council is to be elected by its members, from among its most senior member judges (Art. 109). This model would appear to be consistent with the recommendations included in the Special Rapporteur’s Annual Report 2009. 4. CONCLUSION The importance of judicial independence to constitutional democracy cannot be overstated. Courts serve to protect human rights and to secure the rule of law, and in so doing help to ensure that the principles of constitutional democracy are upheld. In order to do so, it is critical that courts operate consistently with the tenets of judicial independence. International law provides a working definition of judicial independence, comprising five components, which every legal system must meet: courts must (a) be impartial; (b) approach cases in an unbiased manner; (c) display no prejudice; (d) be politically independent; and (e) operate without fear. The international law offers both “hard law”, binding rules for judicial independence, and “soft law” guidelines for judicial independence. International law permits these rules and guidelines to be met in a variety of ways in different domestic legal and constitutional contexts, and does not demand that specific models of the judiciary be established or that specific mechanisms and procedures for regulating judicial conduct be put in place. Assessing whether a country’s rules and mechanisms for the operation of the judiciary are consistent with the international law requires detailed and thorough analysis of relevant rules and mechanisms in light of the international law. 13