22. The Chamber agrees with the Minister of Justice that even though standing as a candidate in an election
is not a candidate’s business or professional activity within the meaning of the Acts regulating economic and
professional activity, it is nonetheless one of the main tools for a candidate’s political activity (e.g. standing
as a candidate, political awareness-raising, communicating with voters and regional organisations or a
political party). Therefore, in the opinion of the Chamber, political activities by a political party or a
candidate on its list and by an independent candidate should also be interpreted as business or professional
activity within the meaning of § 2(2) cl. 4) of the AdA. Thus, systematic interpretation of § 2(2) cl. 4) of the
AdA and § 51 of the REA excludes marking a vehicle used in a politician’s professional activity with their
name, contact details, trade mark, domain name and area of activity from the prohibition on political outdoor
advertising.
23. On the basis of the foregoing, by interpreting § 51 of the REA and § 2(2) cl. 4) of the AdA in
combination, the Chamber concludes that the prohibition on political outdoor advertising did not extend to
the vehicle used by A. Talvik, and § 51 of the REA did not prohibit marking that vehicle with the
information indicated in the PBGB precept. On the basis of the foregoing, § 51 of the REA is not a relevant
provision in the instant case.
24. Since the Supreme Court can only decide ? within constitutional review court proceedings in the frame
of specific constitutional review ? on the constitutionality of a provision which needs to be applied for
adjudicating the case, the Supreme Court is unable to resolve the application by Tallinn Court of Appeal.
Under § 15(1) cl. 6) of the Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act, the application by Tallinn Court of
Appeal must be dismissed.
Source URL: https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/constitutional-judgment-3-4-1-3-17