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OCTOBER TERM, 1960. Opinion of the Court. 364 U. S. interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant controlling facts. Thus, a correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter and kindred cases is not that the, State has plenary power to manipulate in every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that the State's authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution considered in those cases. The Hurter opinion itself intimates that a state legislature may not be omnipotent even as to the disposition of some types of property owned by municipal corporations, 207 U. S., at 178-181. Further, other cases in this Court have refused to allow a State to abolish a municipality, or alter its boundaries, or merge it with another city, without preserving to the creditors of the old city some effective recourse for the collection of debts owed them. Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514; Broughton v. Pensacola,93 U. S. 266. For example, in.Mobile v. Watson the Court said: "Where the resource for the payment of the bonds of a municipal corporation is the power of taxation existing when the bonds were issued, any law which withdraws or limits the taxing power and leaves no adequate means for the payment of the bonds is forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and is null and void." Mobile v. Watson, supra, 116 U. S., at 305. This line of authority conclusively.shows that the Court has never acknowledged that the States have power to do as they will with municipal cotporations regardless of consequences. Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of rele-

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Gomillion v. Lightfoot

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether a state legislature's redefinition of municipal boundaries—designed to exclude African American voters from a city—violates the Fifteenth Amendment, and whether such a legislative act is subject to federal judicial review despite the legislature's general authority to define municipal boundaries.

Alleged Acts: In 1957, the Alabama state legislature enacted Act 140, which redefined the municipal boundaries of the City of Tuskegee, Alabama. The legislation transformed the city's shape "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," effectively removing from the city virtually all of its African American residents—approximately 400 out of 410 Black voters—while leaving white voters unaffected. The act was "solely concerned" with segregating voters on the basis of race. As a result, African American citizens who had previously lived and voted within the city were stripped of their municipal voting rights, while the city retained its status as the administrative and economic center of the area. A group of African American citizens of Tuskegee, led by Charles Gomillion, filed suit against Mayor P.O. Lightfoot and the City of Tuskegee, challenging the boundary redefinition as unconstitutional.

Procedural history: The state trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that the legislature had plenary authority to redefine municipal boundaries and that the question was non-justiciable. The Supreme Court of Alabama then affirmed the dismissal.

Summary: Gomillion v. Lightfoot was a foundational voting rights decision in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Alabama legislature's redefinition of Tuskegee's city boundaries to remove nearly all African American voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment. The case established two critical principles: (1) a state's power to draw or redraw municipal boundaries is not absolute and may be reviewed by federal courts when used as an instrument of racial discrimination in voting; and (2) the Fifteenth Amendment limits not only direct denials of the franchise but also indirect mechanisms—such as boundary manipulation—that achieve the same discriminatory result. The decision is widely regarded as the first case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a racial gerrymander and laid the groundwork for the development of racial gerrymandering jurisprudence that followed in cases such as Shaw v. Reno (1993).

Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Alabama courts and held that Act 140 violated the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court rejected the argument that the legislature's power to define municipal boundaries is absolute and beyond judicial review. When a legislature uses that power as a vehicle for racial discrimination in voting, the act is subject to constitutional scrutiny. The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment does not merely guarantee the individual right to cast a ballot; it also limits the states' power to draw political boundaries for the purpose of denying or abridging that right on account of race. The Court characterized Act 140 as an act "so extraordinary as to be not even within familiar abuses of gerrymandering," distinguishing it from ordinary political gerrymandering by its expressly racial purpose and effect.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Act 140 of the Alabama Legislature, Fourteenth Amendment, and Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Nov 14, 1960

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep364/usrep364339/usrep364339.pdf

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Gomillion v. Lightfoot.pdf
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Gomillion v. Lightfoot

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