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GOMILLION v. LIGHTFOOT. 339 Opinion of the Court. prived of property without due process of law by being subjected to increased tax burdens as a result of the consolidation of his city with another. Related cases, upon which the respondents also rely, such as Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 250 U. S. 394; and Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307, are far off the mark. They are authority only for the principle that no constitutionally protected contractual obligation arises between a State and its subordinate governmental entities solely as a result of their relationship. In short, the cases that have come before this Court regarding legislation by States dealing with their political subdivisions fall into two classes: (1) those in which it is claimed that the State, by virtue of the prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contract (Art. I, § 10) and of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is without power to extinguish, or alter the boundaries of, an existing municipality; and (2) in which it is claimed that the State has no power to change the identity of a municipality whereby citizens of a pre-existing municipality suffer serious economic disadvantage. Neither of these claims is supported by such a specific limitation upon State power as confines the States under the Fifteenth Amendment. As to the first category, it is obvious that the creation of municipalities-clearly a political act-does not come within the conception ofa contract under the Dartmouth College case. 4 Wheat. 518. As to the second, if one principle clearly emerges from the numerous decisions of this Court dealing with -taxation it is that the Due Process Clause affords no immunity against mere inequalities in tax burdens, nor does it afford protection against their increase as an indirect consequence of a State's exercise of its political powers. Particularly in-dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an 567741 0-61-27

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Gomillion v. Lightfoot

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether a state legislature's redefinition of municipal boundaries—designed to exclude African American voters from a city—violates the Fifteenth Amendment, and whether such a legislative act is subject to federal judicial review despite the legislature's general authority to define municipal boundaries.

Alleged Acts: In 1957, the Alabama state legislature enacted Act 140, which redefined the municipal boundaries of the City of Tuskegee, Alabama. The legislation transformed the city's shape "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," effectively removing from the city virtually all of its African American residents—approximately 400 out of 410 Black voters—while leaving white voters unaffected. The act was "solely concerned" with segregating voters on the basis of race. As a result, African American citizens who had previously lived and voted within the city were stripped of their municipal voting rights, while the city retained its status as the administrative and economic center of the area. A group of African American citizens of Tuskegee, led by Charles Gomillion, filed suit against Mayor P.O. Lightfoot and the City of Tuskegee, challenging the boundary redefinition as unconstitutional.

Procedural history: The state trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that the legislature had plenary authority to redefine municipal boundaries and that the question was non-justiciable. The Supreme Court of Alabama then affirmed the dismissal.

Summary: Gomillion v. Lightfoot was a foundational voting rights decision in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Alabama legislature's redefinition of Tuskegee's city boundaries to remove nearly all African American voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment. The case established two critical principles: (1) a state's power to draw or redraw municipal boundaries is not absolute and may be reviewed by federal courts when used as an instrument of racial discrimination in voting; and (2) the Fifteenth Amendment limits not only direct denials of the franchise but also indirect mechanisms—such as boundary manipulation—that achieve the same discriminatory result. The decision is widely regarded as the first case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a racial gerrymander and laid the groundwork for the development of racial gerrymandering jurisprudence that followed in cases such as Shaw v. Reno (1993).

Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Alabama courts and held that Act 140 violated the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court rejected the argument that the legislature's power to define municipal boundaries is absolute and beyond judicial review. When a legislature uses that power as a vehicle for racial discrimination in voting, the act is subject to constitutional scrutiny. The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment does not merely guarantee the individual right to cast a ballot; it also limits the states' power to draw political boundaries for the purpose of denying or abridging that right on account of race. The Court characterized Act 140 as an act "so extraordinary as to be not even within familiar abuses of gerrymandering," distinguishing it from ordinary political gerrymandering by its expressly racial purpose and effect.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Act 140 of the Alabama Legislature, Fourteenth Amendment, and Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Nov 14, 1960

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep364/usrep364339/usrep364339.pdf

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Gomillion v. Lightfoot.pdf
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Gomillion v. Lightfoot

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