that standard. The fact that Parliament may have enacted legislation, concerning which the Attorney-General has reported that the measure is not a justifiable limit on a right, does not affect this analysis. The s 7 report and a formal declaration serve different purposes albeit there may be debate about the effect of an adverse s 7 report on the exercise of the discretion to grant relief. [47] Nothing turns on the choice of wording in s 92J of the Human Rights Act emphasised by the Solicitor-General. Two points can be made. First, s 92J was necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Human Rights Review Tribunal, as a statutory body without inherent jurisdiction, the power to make a declaration. And second, we agree with the Courts below that the s 92J jurisdiction provides some support for the notion declarations of inconsistency are within judicial function. [48] It follows also that we do not consider this analysis is inconsistent with the legislative history, namely, the enactment of the Bill of Rights as an ordinary statute rather than, as initially proposed, supreme law.58 [49] In terms of the legislative history, for the reasons given in Baigent nor do we see that the absence of a remedies clause in the Bill of Rights alters the position.59 We add that art 25 of the draft Bill attached to the White Paper would have provided for persons whose rights had been “infringed or denied” to “apply … to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”.60 The White Paper said that in most situations covered by the Bill of Rights the courts would be able to “provide a remedy from their present armoury”.61 Hence, the White Paper set out various remedies from that armoury including that:62 • 58 59 60 61 62 a person who wishes to take action forbidden by a statute claimed to be in breach of the Bill can seek a declaration. The impact of the legislative history and, in particular, the shift away from supreme law is discussed by Claudia Geiringer “The Dead Hand of the Bill of Rights? Is the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 a Substantive Legal Constraint on Parliament’s Power to Legislate?” (2007) 11 Otago LR 389 at 389–392; and see also Scott Stephenson From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2016) at 191–193. Baigent, above n 28, at 676–677 per Cooke P, 691 per Casey J, 698–699 per Hardie Boys J, 707 per Gault J, and 718 per McKay J. The White Paper, above n 27, at 114. At [10.184]. At [10.184].