With reference to Baigent, the point was put in this way in Attorney-General v Chapman:49 While it naturally followed that ordinary judicial remedies were available for the enforcement and protection of rights, the strength of this expression of the [Bill of Rights’] purpose required that the courts develop the current law where necessary rather than simply preserve the status quo. We now explain why we do not see this approach to the Bill of Rights as [40] inconsistent with the terms of the Bill of Rights and, indeed, we consider that it is a means of meeting its stated objectives. Taking the latter point first, the purposes include protecting the rights and [41] freedoms contained within it and, as well, affirming New Zealand’s commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR).50 Under art 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR the states parties to the Covenant undertake to ensure those whose rights are violated “have an effective remedy”. 51 In a situation such as the present, there is no other effective remedy.52 The importance of the rights suggests that, unless granting such a remedy is inconsistent with the statutory language, the courts should follow the usual approach and provide a remedy. The Attorney-General seeks to distinguish Baigent (and other cases like [42] Chapman and Taunoa) which support the proposition that an effective remedy should be provided on the basis those cases dealt with executive acts. This distinction may be a reason for restraint in granting a declaration but, given the statutory scheme, there is no apparent reason to erect a jurisdictional bar. Indeed, the desirability of providing an effective remedy suggests that as a matter of policy the same principles should apply. [43] The latter point finds support in the fact that the Bill of Rights expressly applies to acts done by the legislative branch.53 It is possible to construe s 3 as clarifying the 49 50 51 52 53 Attorney-General v Chapman, above n 28, at [118] per McGrath and William Young JJ. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). See also art 2(3)(b) and (c). The same could be said of the example given by William Young and O’Regan JJ in their reasons below at [143]. Section 3(a). See also Mark Elliott “Interpretative Bills of Rights and the Mystery of the Unwritten Constitution” [2011] NZ L Rev 591 at 615–617.