themselves back because the disability was not removed. That might raise questions of the propriety of such retrospective legislation but not of the capacity to make such laws.” Likewise, Sikri, J. expressly rejected the contention that retrospective amendment in election law was bad because it was not a healthy practive and because such a course was liable to be abused in the following words: “The apprehension that is may not be a healthy practice and this power might be abused in a particular case are again no grounds for limiting the powers of the State Legislature.” 233. The above observations also provide an answer to the contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the provisions of the amendment made by Act 40 of 1975 can be abused. I may state that in case the provisions of the amended law are abused, and some of this instances of abuse were visualized by Mr. Shanti Bhushan during the course of arguments, this Court would not be helpless in the matter. The proper course in such an event would be to strike down the action taken under the amended law and not the law itself. 234. Reference was also made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan to the effect of retrospective amendment in cases which may arise under Section 123 (1) of the RP Act. We are in the present case not concerned with Section 123 (1) of the RP Act and consequently it is not necessary to express any opinion with regard to the impact of the amendment upon Section 123 (1) of the RP Act. Nor is it necessary to express opinion on the point as to whether it is permissible to make a law which has the effect of creating a corrupt practice or disqualification retrospectively and thus unseating a returned candidate as such a question does not arise in this case. 235. The change in the definition of the word “candidate” to which our attention has been invited by Mr. Shanti Bhushan does not impinge upon the process of free and fair elections. The fact that as a result of the above change, we have to take into account only the prejudicial activity of the candidate or his election agent from the date of the nomination of the candidate and not from the date he holds himself out as a candidate does not affect the process of free and fair elections. It is necessary while dealing with corrupt practice relating to elections to specify the period within which the impugned act, alleged to constitute corrupt practice should have been done. As a result of the amendment, the legislature has fixed the said period to be as from the date of nomination instead of the period as from the date on which the candidate with the election in prospect began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate. It is common experience that the date from which a candidate holds himself out as a prospective candidate is often a matter of controversy between the parties. The result is that an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty creeps in finding the date from which a person can be said to be candidate. As a result of the change in the definition of candidate, the legislature has fixed a definite date, viz., that of nomination, instead of the earlier time which had an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty about it for finding as to when a person became a candidate.