of natural justice should be observed in exercising it, the nature of the power would call for its observance. 306. The Solicitor General contended that the amending body, in declaring that the election was valid was exercising its constituent legislative power; that legislative power does not adjudicate but only creates validity, even retrospectively by enacting a law with that effect; that validation is lawmaking; that it alters the legal position by making new law and that validation may take place before or after a judgment. He said that by the repeal of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the amending body had wiped out not only the election petition but also the judgment of the High Court and has deprived the respondent of the right to raise any dispute as regards the validity of the election of the appellant and, therefore, there was no dispute to be adjudicated upon by the amending body. He also said – I think, in the alternative – that although the law relating to election petitions and other matters connected therewith was dispensed with in respect of the appellant, the amending body had the ideal norms of fair and free election in its view for adjudging the validity of the election. He submitted that it was open to the amending body to gather facts from any source and as the facts collected by the High Court were there factually the amending body looked into them and applied the ideal norms of election for adjudging its validity. 307. It is difficult to understand when the amending body expressly excluded the operation of all laws relating to election petition and matters connected therewith by the first part of clause (4), what ideal norms of free and fair election it had in view in adjudging the validity of the election of the appellant. I cannot conceive of any pre-existing ideal norms of elecion apart from the law enacted by the appropriate legislatures. If the amending body evolved new norms for adjudging the validity of the particular election, it was the exercise of a despotic power and that would damage the democratic structure of the Constitution. 308. Quite apart from it, there is nothing on the face of the amendment to show that the amending body ascertained the facts of the case or applied any norms for determining the validity of the election. I do not think that under Art. 368 the amending body was competent to pass an ordinary law with retrospective effect to validate the election. It can only amend the constitution by passing a law of the rank of which the Constitution is made of. 309. There is also nothing to show that the amending body validated the election with reference to any change of the law which formed the foundation of the judgment. The cases cited by the Solicitor General to show that a competent legislature has power to validate an invalid election do not indicate that there can be a validation without changing the law which invalidated the election. Nor do I think that a contested election can be validated without an authority applying the new law to the facts as ascertained by judicial process. If the Court which ascertained the facts and applied the law was rendered coram non Judge, the facts ascertained by it