exercised within the walls of the House, the House itself is the judge. He referred to May's Parliamentary Practice (18th ed. pp. 82-83) and also to Bradlaugh v. Gossett, (1884) 12 QBD 271. 285-286 in this connection. He further said that if an outside agency illegally prevents a member from participating in the proceedings of the House, the House has power to secure his presence in the House and cited May's Parliamentary Practice (18th ed. pp. 92-95) to support the proposition. 376. These passages throw no light on the question in issue here. Ever since the decision of Hold C. J. in Ashby v. White. (1703) 14 St. Tr. 695 it has been settled that privilege is part of the common law and cannot affect rights to be exercised outside or independently of the House. Regularity of internal proceedings is one thing; the constitutional rights of the subject are another; and it is the latter which are in issue in a case where the question is whether the document is a statute. See Heuston: Essays in constitutional Law, 2nd ed., p. 22. 377. Article 85 (1) provides that the President shall from time to time summon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. 378. The detention of these members of parliament was by statutory authorities in the purported exercise of their statutory power. It would be strange if a statutory authority by an order which terms out to be illegal could prevent the houses of Parliament from meeting as enjoined by article 85. If a statutory authority passes an illegal order of detention and thus prevents a member of parliament from attending the House, how can the proceedings of parliament become illegal for that reason? It is the privilege of parliament to secure the attendance of persons illegally detained. But what would happen if the privilege is not exercised by parliament? I do not think that the proceedings of parliament would become illegal for that reason. 379. The suspension of the remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights by the order of the President under Article 359 is dependent upon a valid proclamation of emergency under Article 352. If a situation arose which authorized the President to issue a proclamation under Article 352, he could also suspend, under Article 359 the remedy to move the court to enforce the fundamental rights. These are the constitutional functions of the President and unless it is established that the proclamation made by the President under Article 352 or the suspension under Article 359 of the remedy for enforcement of fundamental rights is unconstitutional it is impossible to hold that the President has in any way illegally prevented the release of these members from the supposed illegal detention so as to make a session of parliament unconstitutional in consequence of the inability of those members to attend the session. In other words, the President in performing his constitutional function under these articles has not authorized the illegal detention of any person let alone any member of parliament or unconstitutionally prevented the release from custody of any member. He has