defect in the enactment of either the 1975 Act or of the 39th Amendment? Whether provisions of the Acts of 1974 and 1975 are immune from attack even on the ground that they resulted in a departure from the "basic structure" of our Constitution as explained by this Court in Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala 1973 (1) Supple SCR 1 = (AIR 1973 SC 1461) by having been included in the 9th Schedule of our Constitution which does protect them from a challenge on the ground of any contravention of part III guaranteeing fundamental rights to citizens and other persons or in other words were the limits of the basic structure only operative against Constitutional amendments or apply to ordinary statutes as well? Are any of the provisions of the Acts of 1974 and 1975 void for departures from or damage to any part of the "basic structure" of our Constitution or for any other excess of misuse of law making powers? 396. We do not when such a case comes up before us concern ourselves with the validity of provisions other than those which affect the case before us. Nor do we consider the objects of any provision in vacuo divorced from the facts of the case to be decided. Therefore, parties had to and did address us on the broad features of the findings given by the learned trial Judge and the nature of the evidence given to support them so that we may be able to decide inter alia whether any "validation" of the original respondent's election which was the evident purpose of clause (4) of Article 329-A sought to be added by Section 4 of the 39th Amendment was at all necessary. If that election was not really void and had been wrongly held by the trial Court to be vitiated it did not need to be validated at all. In that event a purported validation would be an exercise in futility before this Court had decided these appeals. Could it not be said that the intended validation was premature inasmuch as it proceeded on a basically erroneous premise that the original respondent's election was invalid when the question of its validity was sub judice in this Court? How could such a premise be assumed to be correct before this Court had gone into merits and decided the appeals pending before it? Such an inquiry is not irrelevant if the very nature and purpose of the exercise of a power are put in issue by both sides. 397. If the existence of the judgment of the allahabad High Court created the impression that it must be assumed to be correct even before this Court had pronounced upon the correctness of the judgment the stay order given by this Court should have removed it. The legal effect of that stay order was that the trial Court's order to use the language of Section 116-A (4) (sic) (116-B (3) (?)) of the Act, "shall be deemed never to have taken effect." It did not matter if the stay order out of deference for existing precedents had been framed in the form of a "conditioned" stay that is to say a stay in law and effect with certain conditions annexed. It was not a "conditional" stay Indeed having regard to the nature of the order the operation of which was to be stayed there could be no "conditional" stay here. As to the legal effect of such a stay order there is no doubt in my mind that considering the clear words of S. 116A (4) (sic) (116-B (3) (?)) of the Act it deprived the order of the High Court of any operative force whatsoever during the pendency of these appeals. There