"implication", where there is such a species of liability in law comparable to a criminal liability is to be fastened upon an individual the prosecutor is to be expected, as a part of an elementary duty to give fair notice and a fair opportunity to meet what the individual has really to be made liable for either because of some act or omission of the individual concerned or even more so for that of an agent or another person for which there may be some sort of vicarious liability from facts showing consent or agency to give full particulars of circumstances from which such implications or vicarious liabilities may arise I do not find that this was done here. 406. The law must lay done a duty to prevent by taking some steps which are not taken before a person is held liable for an omission. And there is a difference between omission to prevent the doing of something and actual consent to the doing of it. I do not find in the petition any case of a liability from omissions to do something set up obviously because the law does not impose upon the candidate the duty to prevent the giving of voluntary assistance by others whether officials or not Nor is there anywhere in the petition a case of procurement by consenting to aid obtained through others. It has to be remembered that on the language of Section 123 (7) a liability is not created by merely not rejecting voluntarily given aid. The candidate may not often be aware of the voluntarily given assistance so as to be able to reject it. A case of consent which can be legally set up is only one of consenting to active obtaining or procurement by an agent or by some other person who becomes for the purposes of the specific aid given and consented to ordinarily prior to obtaining it as good as an agent employed by the candidate. 407. On the terms of Section 123 (7) the following three types of cases of actual obtaining of assistance as distinguished from abetment or attempting to obtain it can be legally set up either exclusively or alternatively against a candidate; firstly a direct obtaining of it by the act of the candidate himself; secondly, an indirect or vicarious procurement of it by the acts of a duly constituted agent; and thirdly, an indirect or vicarious procurement of it by the acts of a person who though not a duly constituted agent, becomes constructively an agent for the purpose of some particular aid obtained because it was assented to by the candidate at a time which must ordinarily be before the aid is given, so that the person through whom assistance is obtained is a constructive agent for this particular aid at the time when it is given. The term procurement should strictly speaking apply only in the last two types of cases. A reference to Section 100 (1) (b) further emphasises the position that a corrupt practice for which the High Court is to declare an election void must have been committed either "by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent". A case falling under Section 100 (1) (d) (ii) of "a corrupt practice committed in the interest of a candidate by an agent other than his election agent" is very different and postulates : firstly a corrupt practice which can be committed only by an agent; and secondly, the existence of such an agent. A case falling under Section 100 (1) (d) requires also proof of the further fact that the result of the election was materially affected by the corrupt practice.