committed by four classes of persons only, viz., the candidate, his election agent, persons acting with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, and those acting without such consent. The corrupt practices committed by the first three classes of persons are covered by Section 100(1) (b) while those committed by persons falling in the fourth class are provided against in Section 100(1) (d) (ii).” The same Bench of the Allahabad High Court in J.P. Rawat v. K.D. Paliwal, (1959) 20 Ele LR 443 (All) had held (at p. 456): “.........Even in the case of admitted workers in whose case also general consent to work for the candidate may be implied the consent of the returned candidate to corrupt practice or practices complained against have to be separately proved, and reliance upon general consent, express or implied, to work legitimately for the candidate is not deemed sufficient.” 442. After 14-1-1971, the Prime Minister, like everyone else concerned, obviously believed that Shri Kapur was no longer a Government servant. As I have already pointed out, this was the legally correct assumption. Even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that this was not so and that the learned Judge had correctly held that Shri Kapur's resignation became effective from 25-1-1971, there could be no liability for a corrupt practice by merely permitting Shri Kapur to resign. The uncontroverted evidence is that after resigning. Shri Kapur went to Rae Bareli voluntarily, without any request or suggestion made to him by the original respondent or by anybody else to go to Rae bareli and work for her election. Even his appointment as the original respondent's election agent on 1-2-1971, according to Shri Kapur's evidence was the result of a suggestion of Shri Dal Bahadur Singh at Rae Bareli, apparently during the Prime Minister's visit to her constituency. 443. Cases in which help rendered voluntarily by a Government servant without any attempt by the candidate concerned to “obtain” or “procure” it were held not to constitute a “Corrupt practice” of the candidate, whatever be the impropriety of it for the Government servant himself were completely overlooked by the learned Judge. In Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, (1957) 13 Ele LR 262 (All) a Division Bench of Allahabad (Mootham C.J. and Mukerji, J.) had pointed out that a Government servant has a “private personality” too. Similar observations of Dua J. are found in a Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court (See: Ram Phal v. Braham Parkash, 23 Ele LR 92 = (AIR 1962 Punj 129)). 444. On the conclusions reached by the learned Judge himself the acts of Shri Kapur between the period 25-1-1971 and 6-2-1971, the date of the publication of the notification, could not be taken into account as no corrupt practice could possibly exist in that period due to the participation of Shri Kapur in any election work. And with regard to the two earlier periods beginning with 7-1-1971. I am unable to see, for the reasons given above how any corrupt practice could be committed by the original respondent vicariously due to anything done by Shri Kapur, even if one were to apply the law as it existed before the amendments of the Act.