Prime Minister by the construction of rostrums or provision of power for the loud-speakers, for which the party was also billed, at least to the extent of 1/4th of the expenses of the rostrums and wholly as regards the expenses of loud-speakers were given by the officers concerned in the performance of their official duties. This is not the same thing as ‘‘obtaining’’ or ‘‘procuring’’ by solicitation. 475. Learned Counsel for the election petitioner has, however, put forward the same objection to this retrospective amendment as the one against a change in the definition of ‘‘candidate’’. It apears to me that this amendment is merely clarificatory of the state of law as it really was even before the amendment. On the view I take, there is no question here of altering the ‘‘rules of the game’’ to the disadvantage of the election petitioner. The disadvantage, if any, was there already because of the consequences which, I think, legally and naturally flow from the occupation of the high office of the Prime Minister of this country. 476. There is no attack on the validity of Section 123 (7) of the Act as it existed before the amendment. Hence, there could be no challenge to the validity of the amendment if it does not, as I think it does not, change the law but merely clarifies it. 477. Learned Counsel for the election petitioner contended that, as a candidate at an election, the Prime Minister and an ordinary candidate should enjoy equal protection of the laws and should be afforded equal facilites irrespective of the office occupied by one of two or more candidates. Such an attack upon the validity of this amendment seems to me to be possible only under the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. But, as Act 40 of 1975, has been placed by Section 5 of the 39th Amendment in the protected 9th Schedule of the Constitution, it becomes immune from such an attack. After the practically unanimous opinion of this Court in Kesavananda Bharti’s case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (Supra), that such an immunisation of an enactment from an attack based upon an alleged violation of the chapter on fundamental rights is constitutionally valid, I do not think that a similar attack can be brought in through the back door of a ‘‘basic structure’’ of the Constitution. Moreover, I am unable to see how this particular amendment has anything to do with damage to any part of the ‘‘basic structure’’ of the Constitution. Even if an attack on the ground of a violation of Article 14 were open today. I think that the occupation of such a high and important office as that of the Prime Minister of this country, with all its great hazards and trials, would provide a rational basis for reasonable classification in respect of advantages possessed by a Prime Minister as a candidate at an election due to arrangements made necessary by considerations of safety and protection of the life and person of the Prime Minister. Hence, I am unable to see any sustainable ground of attack at all on the validity of this provision. 478. Before I proceed further, I may mention that I have dealt with the findings of the learned Judge, assailed by the original respondent’s appeal No. 837 of 1975, perhaps in greater length and depth, after going through the