matter of Issue No. 9, had exceeded the limit of authorised expenditure imposed by Section 77 of the Act read with Rule 90. On this issue, the learned Judge had considerned every allegedly omitted item of expense very thoroughly and had reached the conclusion that the following 3 items, totalling upto Rs. 18,183.50 had to be added to the return of election expenses of the original respondent which mentioned items totalling upto Rs. 12,892.97. These were : (1) Cost of rostrums Rs. 16,000/- (2) Cost of installation of loud-speakers Rs. 1,951/- (3) Cost of providing transport for one journey by car Rs. 232.50. 488. On this issue, the learned Judge's appreciation of evidence was not only very through and correct, but the application of the governing law on the subject also appears to me to be faultless. Ordinarily we do not sitting even in first appeals on questions of law as well as of fact in election cases, go into findings of fact arrived at without misapplication of law or errors of approach to evidence. In the case before us, two main questions and one subsidiary question, each of which is a mixed question of fact and law which deserve consideration by this Court on this issue, have been raised before us. I will deal with these questions briefly seriatim. 489. The first question is : If the party, which a candidate represents, spends or others also spend some money on his or her election, is this expenditure one which can be or should be properly included in the statement of election expenses submitted by the candidate. Arguments before us have proceded on the assumption made by both sides that some expenditure was incurred by the Congress (R) Party and some expenditure must also have been incurred by those who either voluntarily helped or even thrust their supposed assistance whether it is was helpful or not, upon those managing the original respondent's election, which was not shown as part of her election expenses. Is the successful candidate bound under the law, to show this also as part of election expenses? 490. This question assumed special importance after the decision of this Court in Kanwarlal Gupta v. Amarnagh Chawla. AIR 1975 SC 308 at pp. 315-316, where a Division Bench of this Court observed: "Now, if a candidate were to be subject to the limitation of the ceiling, but the political party sponsoring him or his friends and supporters were to be free to spend as much as they like in connections with his election the object of imposing the ceiling would be completely frustrated and the beneficent provision enacted in the interest of purity and genuineness of the democratic process would be wholly emasculated. The mischief sought to be remedied and the evil sought to be suppressed would enter the political arena with redoubled force and vitiate the political life of the country. The great democratic ideal of social, economic and political justice and equality of status and opportunity enshrined in Preamble of our Constitution would remain merely a distant dream eluding our grasp. The legislators could never have intended that what the individual candidate cannot do the political party sponsoring him or his friends and supporters should be free to do. That is