convince us that the effects of the 4th clause of Article 329-A must be such that if this purported addition to our Constitution was upheld, the ‘‘basic structure’’ or the ‘‘basic features’’ or ‘‘the underlying principles’’ of our Constitution will be irreparably damaged so that it could not any longer be looked upon as the same Constitution. It was submitted that the majority view in Kesavananda Bharti’s case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra), which was binding upon us, will compel us to invalidate clause (4) of Article 329-A. There was, in the course of arguments, considerable overlapping between tests and considerations appertaining to the purposes and those involving the effects, consequences, or implications of clause (4) if it was upheld. It was proposed that purposes should be ascertained and their validity determined, inter alia, in the light of the consequences and implications of upholding the validity of the impunged clause. Both sets of contentions involved a definition of the scope of Article 368 and a determination of the exact nature of the function actually performed by the constituent authorities in passing the impugned clause (4) of Article 329-A. 516. We have heard the learned Attorney-General and the learned Solicitor-General of India, in defence of the 4th clause of Article 329-A sought to be added by the 39th Amendment, as well as Mr. A.K. Sen and Mr. Jagnnath Kaushal, learned Counsel for the original respondent, who also supported the validity of the impugned clause. The 1st contention of the learned Counsel seemed directed towards inducing us not to look beyond the language to discover the purposes or the nature of the function performed in passing clause (4) of Article 329-A or its effect. This contention had necessarily to rest upon the assumption that provisions of clauses (4) and (5) and (6) of Article 329-A, sought to be introduced by the 39th Amendment were valid and had the effect of depriving this Court of jurisdiction to determine the validity of clause (4) by exploring the purposes and objects which may lie behind the plain meaning of clause (4). Our diffculty, however, is that even an attempt to give its natural and literal meaning to every word used in Clause (4) after hearing the statements made by learned counsel supporting the 39th Amendment, to the effect that Parliament had itself examined the validity of whatever order and findings on question of fact or law are referred to there, and had reached the conclusion that the order and each of the findings of fact on which it was based must be adjudged to be void and of no effect baffles us very much. This could only mean that Parliament, in its constituent capacity, had functioned as though it was a direct Court of Appeal from a judgment of the High court while an appeal in the last Court is pending – a procedure which has not been shown to have been followed so far in any case brought to our notice either decided in this country or anywhere else in the world, all the cases cited to support such a view being distinguishable on facts and law applicable. 517. In the circumstances of this case, set out above, the findings on contested questions of fact and law and the order indicated by clause (4) could only be those contained in the judgment under appeal by both sides before us. The language of clause (4) was, according to the submissions of learned