constitutionally ‘‘indigestible’’ by a constitution such as ours. Of course, it is not a secret that we have taken some of the basic concepts of our Constitution from British and American Constitutions in their most developed stages. That too must put us on our guard against attempts to foist upon our constitution something simply because it happens to be either a British or American concept of some particular period which could not possibly be found in it today. Therefore, both types of explanation appear to be necessary to an exposition of what may or may not be found in our Consitution. 528. I certainly do not think that Judges of this Court have or should think that they have the power to consciously alter, under the guise of judicial interpretation, what the Constitution declares or necessarily implies even though our pronouncements, interpreting the Constitution, may have the effect of contributing something to the growth or even change of Constitutional law by clearing doubts, removing uncertainties, or filling up of gaps to a limited extent. If the law embodied in our Constitution, as declared by this Court, is not satisfactory. I do not think that we can or should even attempt to stand in the way of a change of any kind sought through appropriate constitutional means by the constitutionally appointed organs and agencies of the State. If, however, this Court is asked to declare as valid what seems to it to fall clearly outside the ambit of the Constitution, and, indeed, what is even claimed to be operating from outside the Constitution and described as a supra-Constitutional power, there may be no alternative left to it except to declare such a claim to be really outside the Constitution. If we were to do that we would only be accepting the professed basis of the claim without conceding its constitutional validity. After all we are really concerned with the questions of constitutional validity which can only be resolved by references to what the Consitution contains, either expressly or by a necessary implication, and not with what is beyond its range except in so far as this also may be necessary to explain what is or what is deemed to be a part of our Constitution. 529. The term ‘‘sovereign’’ is derived from the Latin word ‘‘Superanus’’ which was akin to ‘‘Suzerian’’ suggesting a hierarchy of classes which characterised ancient and medieval societies. In its origin, it is an attribute assigned to the highest living human superiors in the political hierarchy and not some abstract quality of a principle or of a law contained in a document – a meaning as will be shown here, which emerges clearly later. In times of anarchic disorder or oppression, by local straps or chieftains or barons or even bullies and criminals, ordinary mortals have sought the protection of those who could give it because of their superior physical might. No book or document could provide them with the kind of help they needed. They looked upto their ‘‘Sovereign liege and Lord’’ as the medieval monarch was addressed by his subjects, for protection against every kind of tyranny and oppression. 530. The Greeks and Romans were not troubled by theories of ‘‘Sovereignty’’ in a State. The principle that Might was Right was recognised as the unquestioned legally operative principle at least in the field of their