(Para 204) (R) Representation of the People Act (1951), Ss. 123 (5) and (6) – Corrupt practice – Use of vehicles. Per Khanna J :. – It is no doubt true that by using a vehicle for the furtherance of the prospects of candidates in more than one constituency one should not be allowed to circumvent the salutary provisions of the R.P. Act in this respect. To prevent such circumvention, it is essential that evidence should be led to show as to what was the extent of the user of the vehicle in the constituency concerned. (Para 243) (S) Constitution of India, Art. 368 – ‘Constitution power’ of Parliament – Supremacy – It is the constitution and not the constituent power which is supreme. Per Beg J. : – The theory advanced that the ‘Constituent power’ is a power of a kind which is above the constitution itself cannot be accepted. If this theory is accepted it would make it unnecessary to have a constitution beyond one consisting of a single sentence laying down that every kind of power is vested in the constituent bodies which may by means of a single consolidated order or declaration of law, exercise any or all of them themselves whenever they please whether such powers be executive, legislative, or judicial. Both the supremacy of the constitution and separation of powers are parts of the basic structure of the constitution. AIR 1973 SC 1461, Foll. (Para 523) If “constituent power’’. by itself is so transcendental and exceptional as to be above the provisions of the Constitution itself it should not logically speaking be bound even by the procedure of amendment prescribed by Article 368 (2). (Para 524) The words ‘constituent power’ were advisedly used in Art 368 (1) (as introduced by the Constitution 24th Amendment Act) so as to clarify the position and not to put in or to include anything beyond constitution making power in Article 368. (Para 576) The ‘‘constituent power’’ is still bound by the exclusively prescribed procedure to ‘‘amend by way of addition, variation, or repeal’’ any provision of the Constitution. It is entirely a law making procedure elaborately set out in clause (2). The absence of any quasi-judicial procedure, from the comprehensively framed procedural provisions of Art. 368, seems extremely significant. It indicates that it was the clear intention of Constitution makers that no judicial or quasi-judicial function could be performed by parliament whilst operating in the special constituent field of law making. An omission