and peculiar as foreign law as for Common Law Courts it was explained (at page 187). "These views belonged to a time when the distinction between the judicial and legislative functions of Parliament was undrawn or only beginning to be drawn and when the separation of the Lords from the Commons was much less complete than it was in the seventeenth century. Views about the High Court of Parliament and its powers which were becoming antiquated in the time of Coke, continued to be repeated far into the eighteenth century, although after the Restoration principles began to be laid down which were more in accord with the facts of the modern constitution. But much confusion remained which was not diminished by the use of the phrase 'privilige of Parliament'. This only means a body of rights common to both Houses, but it suggests joint action (or enforcement) by both Houses as in legislation whereas from Ferrers’ case in Henry VIII's reign in 1543 each House enforced in own privileges separately. There notions arise from this confusion or thought: 1. That the courts being inferior to the High Court of Parliament, can not call in question the decision of either House on a matter of privilege. 2. That the lex et consuetudo Parliament is a separate law, and therefore unknown to the courts. 3. That a Resolution of either House declaratory of privilege is a judical precedent binding on the Courts." 594. The confusions mentioned above misled some people in this country due to the provision of Article 194(3) of our Constitution on the question whether a House of a Legislature had not only the power to punish a citizen for contempt but also to exercise what is really a judicial power to interpret and determine the ambit of its own jurisdiction. Gajendragadkar C.J. speaking for this Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 = (AIR1965 SC 745) (supra) rejected this claim and explained the English law on the subject. The learned Chief Justice pointed out the incidental character of any claim to a power privilege or immunity which could be covered by Article 194 (3) a provision identically similar to Article 105 (3). He pointed out that the only exceptin to this rule was the power to punish for its own contempt which since the decision of Privy Council in Keilly v. Carson (1842) 4 Moo PC 63 could be thought of as a power of the House of Commons even acquired as a kind of "inheritance" from the powers once possessed by the High Court of Parliament in England. But, as all judicial or quasi-judicial power is, under our Constitution, expressly made exercisable under the supervision of the judicial organs of the State, it was held that a decision about the existance of the power to punish for contempt on the facts of a particular case, is vested in the High Court. Even Sarkar, J., in his dissenting minority opinion said (at p. 513) (of SCR) = (at p. 796 of AIR): "I do not think that the House of Commons was itself ever a Court. The History of that House does not support such a contention." The result is similar to that in England where Courts do