from the legal aspect his grievance on the merits of his case is misconceived. He has no vested right under a palpably erroneous judgment which was the subject matter of the two appeals to this Court. Nevertheless this could only be demonstrated after we had gone into the merits of the case and rendered our decision on the issues in accordance with the law in the 1951 Act. Thus what is involved is the right of the election petitioner to be heard on merits and the power of this Court to look into the merits of the case in order to determine whether the election-petitioner's grievances could have any real legal foundations. I think that this is a basic consideration which must compel us in the light of the principles laid down by us in Kesavananda Bharati's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra) to hold that we must look into his grievances and determine for ourselves where his case stood on the law before it was amended. Our jurisdiction at any rate cannot be barred without creating the impression that what the election petitioner calls "political justice" is being denied to him. 627. The question which arises now is : Was CI (4) of 329-A read with clauses (5) and (6) really meant to bar our jurisdiction to consider the grievances of the petitioner and to decide them or can they be so interpreted as to preserve this court's jurisdictional? 628. Broadly speaking the election petitioner has two heads of grievance : firstly that the election of the original respondent is vitiated by corrupt practices which as I have indicated after considering the case set up by him and the evidence tendered and the law applicable could not possibly succeed even under the law as it stood before the amendment, and, secondly, that our very jurisdiction to go into these grievances is sought to be debarred by clauses (4), (5) and (6) of Article 329-A (4) with the political object of stifling opposition and therefore according to the election petitioner we must declare clause (4) and the connected clauses (5) and (6) of Article 329-A to be invalid. Although, the 1st set of complaints is based upon the provisions of the Act of 1951 the second set arises because of impugned clauses of the 39th Amendment. For the second set of grievances, the action complained of is that of the State itself acting through its law making organs. It is because of this interest of the Union of India, acting in its law making capacity, that we have heard the Attorney General and the Solicitor General. Although the second set of grounds may arise as a result of the 1st set yet they are different. Our jurisdiction to consider these different grounds of complaint does not ordinarily arise at all in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Section 116-A of the Act of 1951. It is for this reason that the election petitioner had filed a separate Writ Petition in the High Court to challenge an amendment of the Act. But, we decided to hear arguments on constitutional issues also without a separate proceeding. The causes of action arising out of the amendments have become attached if I may so put it to the appeals under Section 116-A of the Act because we could not, under the law, hear the appeals unless these obstacles if any, were overcome. 629. Indeed, so for as the original respondent is concerned the effect of Cls (4), (5) and (6) of Article 329-A would be if we were to hold that they bar our