the question of facts. The point of controversy between the parties mainly is that, according to the respondent those facts constituted corrupt practice as defined in Section 123 of the R.P. Act. while according to the appellant those facts did not constitute corrupt practice. In any case, according to the appellant, in view of the amendment made in the RP Act by amending Acts 58 of 1974 and 40 of 1975 these facts did not constitute corrupt practice. The declaration made in part (iii) of clause (4) that the election of the appellant was to be valid in all respects was tantamount in the very nature of things to the repelling of the grounds advanced by the respondent to challenge the election of the appellant. Question therefore arises as to what, if any, was the law which was applied in repelling the grounds advanced by the respondent to challenge the election of the appellant. So far as the existing law relating to election disputes was concerned, part (i) of clause (4) expressly stated that such a law would not apply to the petition filed by the respondent to challenge the election of the appellant. This means that the provisions of the Representation of the People Act were not to apply to the petition filed by the respondent against the appellant. This also means that the amending Acts 58 of 1974 and 40 of 1975 were not to apply to the dispute relating to election of the appellant. 196. The dispute relating to the election of the appellant is also not to be governed by law which is to be enacted under clause (1) of Article 329A. Such a law would apply only to future elections. The result is that so far as the dispute relating to the election of the appellant is concerned, a legal vacuum came into existence. It was open to the constituent authority to fill that vacuum by prescribing a law which was to govern the dispute arising out of the petition filed by the respondent to challenge the election of the appellant. The constituent authority, however, did not do so and straightway proceeded to declare the election of the appellant to be valid. There is nothing in clause (4) to indicate that the constituent authority applied any law in declaring the election of the appellant to be valid and if so, what was that law. 197. I am unable to accede to the argument that the constituent authority kept in view the provisions of the RP Act as amended by Acts 58 of 1974 and 40 of 1975 and their impact on the challenge to the election of the appellant in declaring the election of the appellant to be valid. The difficulty in accepting this argument is that in part (i) of clause (4) the constituent authority expressly stated that the previous law, namely, the RP Act as amended in so far as it related to election petitions and matters connected therewith was not to apply so far as the challenge to the election of the apellant was concerned. It is also difficult to agree that the constitutent authority took into account some other unspecified law or norm in declaring the election of the appellant to be valid. As mentioned earlier, there is nothing in clause (4) to indicate that the constituent authority took into account some other law or norm and if so, what that law or norm was. The position which thus emerges is that according to clause (4) no law was to apply for adjudicating upon the challenge to the election of the appellant and the same was in terms of part (iii) to be valid in all respects. The question