(B) Constitution of India. Art. 329-A (4) and (5) as inserted by Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act 1975 – Validation of election – Constitutional Validity – (Pre and Arts. 14. 105 (3), 329 (b) and 368) – (Interpretation of Statutes) – (Representation of The People Act (1951), S. 116-A). Per Majority – (Khanna, Mathew and Chandrachud, JJ.) : – Clause (4) of Article 329-A as introduced by the Constitution 39th Amendment Act of 1975 is unconstitutional. (Paras 213, 345 and 682) Per Khanna, J. : – Clause (4) of Article 329-A is liable to be struck down on the ground that it violates the principle of free and fair elections which is an essential postulate of democracy and which in its turn is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution inasmuch as (1) it abolishes the forum without providing for another forum for going into the dispute relating to the validity of the election of the appellant and further prescribes that the said dispute shall not be governed by any election law and that the validity of the said election shall be absolute and not consequently be liable to be assailed, and (2) it extinguishes both the right and the remedy to challenge the validity of the aforesaid election. (Para 213) Per Mathew, J. : – Our Constitution, by Article 329 (b) visualizes the resolution of an election dispute on the basis of a petition presented to such authority and in such manner as the appropriate legislature may, by law, provide. The nature of the dispute raised in an election petition is such that it cannot be resolved except by judicial process, namely, by ascertaining the facts relating to the election and applying the preexisting law: when the amending body held that the election of the appellant was valid, it could not have done so except by ascertaining the facts by judicial process and by applying the law. The result of this process would not be the enactment of constitutional law but the passing of a judgement or sentence. The amending body, though possessed of judicial power, had no competence to exercise it, unless it passed a constitutional law enabling it to do so. If, however, the decision of the amending body to hold the election of the appellant valid was the result of the exercise of an ‘irresponsible despotic discretion’ governed solely by what it deemed political necessity or expediency, then, like a bill of attainder, it was a legislative judgement disposing of a particular election dispute and not the enactment of a law re-sulting in an amendment of the Constitution And, even if the latter process (the exercise of despotic discretion) could be regarded as an amendment of the Constitution, the amendment would damage or destroy an essential feature of democracy as established by the Constitution, namely, the resolution of election dispute by an authority by the exercise of judicial power by ascertaining the adjudicative facts and applying the relevant law for determining the real representative of the people. The decision of the amending body cannot be regarded as an exercise in constituent legislative validation of an election. There can be no legislative validation of an election when there is dispute between the parties