body ascertained the facts regarding the election of the appellant and applied the relevant law, the exercise of that power by the amending body would offend the doctrine of separation of powers and that, at any rate this process would not result in an amendment of the Constitution by enacting a law, but only in the passing of a judgment or sentence which can never be characterized as a law let alone a law relating to the Constitution of India. 264. In His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sirpadagalavaru v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp SCR 1 = (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (hereinafter referred to as 'Bharati's case), a majority of seven Judges held that the power conferred under Article 368 of the Constitution was not absolute. They took the view that by an amendment, the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be damaged or destroyed. And, as to what are the basic structures of the Constitution, illustrations have been given by each of these Judges. They include supremacy of the Constitution democratic republican form of Government, secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers among the legislature, executive and judiciary, the federal character of the Constitution, Rule of Law, equality of status and of opportunity; justice, social, economic and political; unity and integrity of the nation and the dignity of the individual secured by the various provisions of the Constitution. There was consensus among these Judges that democracy is a basic structure of the Constitution. I proceed on the assumption that the law as laid down by the majority in that case should govern the decision here, although I did not share the view of the majority. 265. Therefore, if by clause (4), any essential feature of the democratic republican structure of our polity as visualized by the Constitution has been damaged or destroyed, the clause would be ultra vires the Constitution. 266. One way of looking at the first part of clause (4) is that the amending body has, with retrospective effect, repealed the law relating to election petition in respect of the persons specified in clause (1) and hence the judgment rendered on the basis of the previous law relating to election petition became automatically void, and the amending body was merely stating the consequence of the retrospective repeal of the law and therefore the declartion that the judgment was void was not an exercise of judicial function. On the other hand, it might be possible to view the first part of clause (4) as an exercise of judicial power for the reason that, even assuming that by virtue of the retrospective repeal of the law relating to election petition there was no jurisdiction in the High Court to entertain or try the election petition and pass the judgment a repeal simpliciter did not render the judgment ipso facto void and therefore, in making the declaration that the judgment was void, the amending body was performing a function which has traditionally been in the province of court. 267. Be that as it may, I feel no doubt that the amending body, when it declared the election of the appellant to be valid, had to ascertain the adjudicative facts* and apply the relevant norm for adjudging its validity. If however the amending body did not ascertain the facts relating to the election and apply the relevant norm, the declaration of the validity of the election was a fiat of a Shi generis character of the amending body.