stated as a requirement of generality. Here as in s many other fields, John Austin's distinction was basically right, but too rigidly drawn.’’ Friedmann was of the view that a community which had no general prescription at all but only an infinite multitude of individual commands, would not be regarded as having a legal order. It would dissolve into millions of individual relationships* 299. For the purpose of this case I accept as correct the statement of Blackstone already quoted and approved by the Privy Council in Liyanage v. The Queen, (1967) 1 AC 259. I cannot regard the resolution of an election dispute by the amending body as law: It is either a judicial sentence or a legislative judgment like a Bill of Attainder. 300. It is no doubt true that the House of Commons in England used to pass bills of attainder. But the practice has fallen into desuetude, since the year 1696. A bill of attainder is a special act of the legislature, as inflicts capital punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offences, such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. The legislature assumes judicial magistracy pronouncing upon the guilt of the party without any of the common forms and guards of trial, and satisfying itself with proofs, when such proofs are within its reach, whether they are conformable to the rules of evidence or not. In short in all such cases, the legislature exercises the highest power of sovereignty, and what may be properly deemed an irresponsible despotic discretion, being governed solely by what it deems politcal necessity or expediency, and too often under the influence of unreasonable fears or unfounded suspicions.† 301. In U.S. v. Brown, 381 US 437 the Supreme Court of United States of America stated that the main reason why the power to pass bill of attainder was taken away from the Congress was: “Everyone must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and organisation, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamour is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly excited – the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this mode.”‡ Much the same reason will apply to the resolution of an election dispute by an amending body as it consists in all democratic countries of an assembly of persons like parliament. 302. In Liyanage v. The Queen, (1967) 1 AC 259 the appellants had been charged with offences arising out of an abortive coup d'etat on January 27, 1962. The story of the coup d'etat was set out in a White Paper issued by the Ceylon Government. On March 16, 1962 the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act was passed and it was given retrospective effect from January 1. 1962. The Act was limited in operation to those who were accused of offences against the State in or about January 27, 1962. The Act legalised the imprisonment of the appellants while they were awaiting trial and modified a