have ceased to be facts. There are no absolute or immediately evident facts. Only by being first ascertained through legal procedure are facts brought into the sphere of law or we may say though it may sound paradoxical that the competent organ legally creates facts. The Courts perform a constitutive function in ascertaining facts. There is no fact in itself that A has killed B. There is only somebody's belief or knowledge. They are all private opinions without relevance. Only establishment by a competent organ has legal relevance. See Kelsen: General Theory of Law and State, p. 136. And when that organ was rendered coram non judice, and its judgment declared void, the facts created by it perished. They ceased to be facts. Adjudicative facts of an election dispute cannot be gathered by legislative process behind the back of the parties; they can be gathered only by judicial process. The amending body did not ascertain the facts by resorting to judicial process. 310. If Clause (4) was an exercise in legislative validation without changing the law which made the election invalid when there ought to have been an exercise of judicial power of ascertaining the adjudicative facts and applying the law the clause would damage the democratic structure of the Constitution as the Constitution visualizes the resolution of an election dispute by a petition presented to an authority exercising judicial power. The contention that there was no election dispute as clause (4) by repealing the law relating to election petition had rendered the petition filed by the respondent nonest, if allowed, will toll the death knell of the democratic structure of the Constitution. If Article 329 (b) envisages the resolution of an election dispute by judicial process by a petition presented to an authority as the appropriate legislature may by law provide a constitutional amendment cannot dispense with that requirement without damaging an essential feature of democracy viz., the mechanism for determining the real representative of the people in an election as contemplated by the Constitution. 311. All the cases cited by the Solicitor General pertain either to legislative validation of a void election by applying a new law to undisputed facts or to the removal of an admitted disqualification by a law with retrospective effect. 312. In Abeyesekera v. Javatilake, 1932 AC 260, the facts were: An order in council of 1923 made provision as to the Legislative Council in Ceylon, but reserved to His Majesty power to revoke, alter or amend the order. The appellant, as common informer brought an action to recover penalties under the order from the respondent, who he alleged had sat and voted after his seat had become vacant under its provisions by reason of his having a pecuniary interest in a contract with the Government. In 1928, after the action had been brought but before its trial, an amending order in Council was made which provided: “if any such action or legal proceeding has been or shall be instituted, it shall be dismissed and made void, subject to such order as to costs as the Court may think fit to make.” It also amended the Order of 1923 so as to except the office held by the respondent from its operation. The Privy Council held that the Order of 1928 was valid, having regard to the