evidence in the case, than I had set out to do. I have done so far several reasons. Firstly, I think that the nature of the attack upon the bonafides of the amendments made, although ordinarily not even entertainable, having been permitted due to the constitutional importance and gravity of the allegations made, this question could not, in my opinion, be satisfactorily dealt with without considering the nature of the findings and the evidence at some length so as to satisfy myself that no such question could possibly arise here. Secondly, if the amendments were made necessary for reasons brought out fully only by dealing with facts and findings in this case, they could not give rise to any grounds to suggest that there was anything wrong in making amendments to remove such reasons. Therefore, I think, it was necessary to go into these for determining whether the amendments are good. Thirdly, even if the amendments are valid, we had to be satisfied that the tests of corrupts practices alleged are not fulfilled despite the concession of the election petitioner’s learned Counsel that this would be the position. Fourthly, I find that the learned Judge has made certain manifest errors in appraising the evidence and interpreting the law which call for rectification by this Court as no other authority can properly do this. 479. It appears to me, as already indicated by me, that the learned Judge was perhaps unduly conscious of the fact that he was dealing with the case of the Prime Minister of this country. He, therefore, as he indicated in his judgment, seemed anxious not to allow this fact to affect his judgment. Nevertheless, when it came to appraising evidence, it seems to me that, as I have already pointed out, he applied unequal standards in assessing its worth so as to lergely relieve the election petitioner of the very heavy onus of proof that lies on a party which challenges the verdict of a electors by allegations of corrupt practices. He also appeared to be attempting to achieve by means of judicial interpretation an equalisation of conditions under which in his opinion candidates should contest elections. I think that it is not the function of Courts to embark on attempts to achieve what is only in the power of Parliament to accomplish that is to say to bring about equality of conditions where the law permits justifiable discrimination. As this Court has repeatedly pointed out to treat unequally situated and circumstanced persons as though they were equals in the eye of law for all purposes is not really to satisfy the requirements of the equality contemplated by the Constitution. 480. As regards appraisal of evidence in such a case. I may point out that in Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed. (1974) 2 SCC 660 at pp. 666. 672 = (AIR 1975 SC 290 at pp. 294-295) Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for this Court said : "An election once held is not to be treated in a light-hearted manner and defeated candidates or disgruntled electors should not get away with it by filing election petitions on unsubstantial grounds and irresponsible evidence thereby introducing a serious elements of uncertainty in the verdict already rendered by the electorate. An election is a politically sacred public act not of one person or of one official but of the collective will of the whole constituency. Courts naturally must respect this public expression secretly written and show extreme reluctance to set aside or declare void an election