Counsel supporting the amendment, itself meant to convey that, after going into the disputed questions of fact, the constituent bodies had reached the conclusion that the order and the findings must have no legal effect. Indeed, the Solicitor-General went so far as to submit that Parliament must be deemed to be aware of the contents of the whole record of the proceedings in the High Court, including the pleadings, the evidence, and the findings in the judgment of the High Court, as these were all available to it. In other words, we must imagine and suppose that, whatever may be the actual position. Parliament had sat in judgment over the whole case as a Court of appeal would have done. But, the impugned clause (4), if valid, would compel us to make a contrary assumption in as much as it declares that all laws prior to the 39th Amendment, relating to election petitions and ‘‘matters connected therewith’’, which must include the grounds given in Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, were neither to be applied nor ever deemed to have applied to such a case as the one before us. This surely meant that they must be ‘‘deemed’’ not to have been applied by Parliament itself, according to the well-known rule of construction that legal fiction, introduced by a deeming provision, must be carried to its logical conclusion and we must not allow our imagination to boggle at the consequences of carrying the fiction to its logical conclusions (See:East End Dwellings Co. Ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1952) AC 109). 518. At the same time, it was contended, and, this was especially emphasised by Mr. Jagnnath Kaushal, that Parliament and the ratifying legislatures of the State-participating in the constitution making process – had not applied any pre-existing norms but had merely declared and registered, almost automatically without any need to consider anything further or to apply any law whatsoever to any facts, what followed from the abrogation of all pre-existing law, with its procedure and norms so far as the election-petition against the original respondent was concerned. This meant that the constituent bodies, proceeding on the assumption that the High Court had rightly held the original respondent’s election to be invalid by applying the provisions of the 1951 Act, had considered it necessary to validate what really was invalid according to the 1951 Act. In view of what I have already held on merits, such an assumption, if it was there at all, could only be based on a misconception. 519. The conflicting points of view, advanced in support of the amendment, enabled the election-petitioner’s counsel to find support for his contention that the impugned clause (4) obviously meant that a considered judgment on, inter alia disputed questions of fact, however, erroneous, had been swept aside, quite uncemoniously, mechanically, and, without a semblance of quasi-judicial procedure by a purpoted exercise of constituent power by the constituent bodies, consisting of the two Houses of Parliament and the ratifying legislatures of the various States. He urged that the alternative contentions of Mr. Kaushal constituted an admission that no procedure whatsoever, which could be considered either reasonable or appropriate for a judicial or quasi judicial determination of any question of