jurisdiction to go into the merits of the appeals under Section 116-A of the Act. That her grievance against the judgment under appeal also could not be gone into or dealt with. In other words, the original respondent would also be denied an opportunity of asserting her rights under the 1951 Act and of vindicating her stand in the case by showing that there was really no sustainble ground for the findings given by the learned Judge of the High Court against her. We would, therefore, be prevented from doing justice to her case as well if we were to accept the contention that the 39th Amendment bars our jurisdiction to hear the appeals under Section 116-A of the Act on merits. The total effect would be that justice would appear to be defeated even if, in fact, it is not so as a result of the alleged bar to our jurisdiction it were held to be there. Could it be the intention of Parliament that justice should appear to be defeated? I think not. 630. It was also contended before us that we should not go at all into the merits of the case before us as it was a political matter. In other words, the "political question" doctrine was invoked in aid of the submission that we should voluntarily abstain from deciding a question of a "political nature". It is true that the "political question doctrine" has been sometimes invoked, in the past, by the Americal Supreme Court to abstain from taking a decision. In answer to this argument, learned Counsel for the election petitioner cited before us from comments on the Constitution of the United States of American (Analysis and Interpretation by the Congressional Research Service - 1973 Edn. p. 665) that the "political question" doctrine is the result of a "prudential" attitude Courts adopt when they find they their judgments may not be enforced. It was described there as "a way of avoiding a principled decision damaging to the Court or an expedient decision damaging to the principle". It was also pointed out there that this doctrine has been rationalized and considerably narrowed down by the American Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr. (1962) 369 US 186 where it was explained that "nonjusticibility of a political question is primarly function of sepration of powers." It really means that there are matters about which declarations made or certificate granted by the executive wing of Government would be treated as conclusive so that Courts will not go behind them. It was also said there: "Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution". 631. Learned Counsel for the election petitioner also relied upon H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India. (1971) 3 SCR 9 = (AIR 1971 SC 530) where this Court said : (at p. 75) (of SCR) = (at p. 563 of AIR) : "The functions of the State are classified as legislative, judicial and executive; the executive function is the residue which does not fall within the other two functions. Constitutional mechanism in a democratic policy does