affect its validity. If the constituent authority in its wisdom has chosen the validity of a disputed election as the subject-matter of a constitutional amendment, this Court cannot go behind that wisdom. All that this Court is concerned with is the validity of the amendment. I need not go into the question as to whether such a matter, in view of the normal concept of constitutional law, can strictly be the subject of a constitutional amendment. I shall for the purpose of this case assume that such a matter can validly be the subject-matter of a constitutional amendement. The question to be decided is that if the impugned amendment of the Constitution violates a principle which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution can it enjoy immunity from an attack on its validity because of the fact that for the future, the basic structure of the Constitution remains unaffected. The answer to the above question, in my opinion should be in the negative. What has to be seen in such a matter is whether the amendment contravenes or runs counter to an imperative rule or postulate which is an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution. If so, it would be an impermissible amendment and it would make no difference whether it relates to one case or a large number of cases. If an amendment striking at the basic structure of the Constitution is not permissible, it would not acquire validity by being related only to one case. To accede to the argument advanced in support of the validity of the amendment would be tantamount to holding that even though it is not permissible to change the basic structure of the Constitution, whenever the authority concerned deems it proper to make such an amendment, it can do so and circumvent the bar to the making of such an amendment by confining it to one case. What is prohibited cannot become permissible because of its being confined to one matter. 211. Lastly, question arised whether we should strike down clause (4) in its entirety or in part. So far as this aspect is concerned, I am of the view that the different parts of clause (4) are so integrally connected and linked with each other that it is not possible to sever them and uphold the validity of part of it after striking down the rest of it. It would indeed be unfair to the appellant if we were to uphold the first part of clause (4) and strike down other parts or even part (iii). As would be apparent from what follows hereafter, the election of the appellant is being upheld by applying the provisions of the RP Act as amended by Act 40 of 1975. Such a course would not be permissible if we were to uphold the validity of the first part of clause (4) and strike down the other parts. We would also in that event be creating a vacuum which is the very vice for which we are striking down clause (4). I am therefore, of the view that clause 4 should be struck down in its entirety. 212. In view of my finding that clause (4) strikes at the basic structure of the Constitution it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether, assuming that the constituent authority took it upon itself to decide the dispute relating to the validity of the election of the appellant, it was necessary for the constituent authority to hear the parties concerned before it declared the election of the appellant to be valid and thus in effect repelled the challenge of the respondent to the validity of the appellant's election.