public funds, which is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years and a fine under 18 U.S.C. § 3571. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9042(c) and 9012(d). Prosecutors considering false statement charges in connection with conduct violating one of these public funding laws thus have the choice of using either the public funding statute that specifically addresses the conduct or the general false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See also United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985) (affirming Section 1001 charge for currency reporting offense). The administration and civil enforcement of these grant programs are within the FEC’s sole jurisdiction. However, since these are federal funding programs, with federal candidates as the beneficiaries, if there is evidence of an intent to defraud the United States in the implementation of these programs, criminal prosecution is warranted and should be pursued. (d) Mail and wire fraud: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 The federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, which criminalize the use of the mails or interstate wires to further a scheme or artifice to defraud, 63 can provide an additional basis for prosecuting conduct that also violates FECA. Further, conduct in violation of state campaign finance laws, although not subject to FECA’s provisions, may violate other federal laws, like the mail and wire fraud statutes. Federal prosecutors should consider these statutes when evaluating possible charges for unlawful campaign finance conduct. The salary theory of mail and wire fraud, discussed at length in Chapter 2, may also provide a basis to prosecute state and federal campaign financial law violations by candidates and their agents. As discussed, however, courts are split as to whether the salary theory is 63 Except for the jurisdictional element, the mail and wire fraud statutes are identical and courts have interpreted their elements in the same manner. 165