As just discussed, registration to vote is “unitary,” i.e., a single registration qualifies the applicant to cast ballots for all elections. Thus, the jurisdictional requirement that the false information be used to establish eligibility to vote in a federal election is satisfied automatically whenever a false statement is made to get one’s name on the registration rolls. See United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 1981). On the other hand, when the false data is furnished to poll officials for the purpose of enabling a voter to cast a ballot in a particular election (as when one voter attempts to impersonate another), it must be shown that a federal candidate was being voted upon at the time. In such situations, the evidence should show that the course of fraudulent conduct could have jeopardized the integrity of the federal race, or, at a minimum, that the name of a federal candidate was on the ballot. United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903, 908–09 (4th Cir. 1982). In United States v. Boards, 10 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 1993), the Eighth Circuit confirmed the broad reach of the “false information” provision of Section 10307(c). The defendants in this case, and their unindicted co-conspirators, had obtained and marked the absentee ballots of other registered voters by forging the voters’ names on ballot applications and directing that the ballots be sent to a post office box without the voters’ knowledge. Id. at 588. The district court incorrectly granted post-verdict judgments of acquittal as to those counts in which the defendants’ roles were limited to fraudulently completing an application for an absentee ballot, based on its conclusions that: (1) the statute did not extend to ballot applications, (2) the statute did not cover giving false information as to the names of real voters (as opposed to fictitious names), and (3) the defendants could not be convicted when the ballots were actually voted by an unidentified co-conspirator. Id. at 589. The court of appeals rejected each of these narrow interpretations of Section 10307(c). It first held that an application for a ballot falls within the broad definition of “vote” in the statute, 41