This prosecutive theory was used in a case in New Hampshire. In United States v. Tobin, No. 04-216-01 (SM), 2005 WL 3199672, at *1 (D.N.H. Nov. 30, 2005), a senior political party official was charged with violating Section 241 and with telephone harassment offenses under 47 U.S.C. § 223 in connection with a scheme to jam telephone lines for ride-to-the-polls services offered by the opposing political party and the local fire department during the 2002 general elections. The object of the conspiracy was to impede certain voters from getting to the polls in order to influence what was perceived to have been a very close United States Senate contest. Id. The defendant challenged the Section 241 charge, claiming that the statute had never been applied to a voter suppression scheme such as the one involved in that case, and that application of Section 241 to the scheme would therefore deprive him of constitutionally required notice that his activities were proscribed. Id. The district court disagreed and upheld the charge, stating: [T]he “fair warning” issue turns generally on whether a person of ordinary intelligence would know that the acts charged would violate specific constitutional rights. Or, with reference to the allegations in the superseding indictment, whether a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that participating in an agreement, or conspiracy, whose purpose is to prevent qualified persons from freely exercising their right to vote, would violate Section 241. Plainly, a reasonable person would understand that the right to vote is a right protected by the Constitution. He or she would also understand that knowingly joining a conspiracy with the specific intent to impede or prevent qualified persons from exercising the right to vote is conduct punishable under Section 241. Id. at *3. 29 The defendant’s convictions on the telephone harassment charges were reversed on appeal due to error in the jury instructions under § 223. United States v. Tobin, 480 F.3d 53, 56–58 (1st Cir. 2007). 29 57