*11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2015) (holding that “a person who has committed election fraud in order to obtain the normal salary given to the person holding that elected office has not committed money or property fraud, because the victim – the government – has not been deprived either of any money or property or the choice in how to spend the money”); United States v. George, No. 86–CR–123, 1987 WL 48848, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 20, 1987) (similar). Thus, the salary theory may still be viable in the election fraud context. Schemes designed to fraudulently elect a public official are materially indistinguishable from schemes to fraudulently obtain other government employment for purposes of Sections 1341 and 1343. The holdings of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in Ratcliff and Turner, respectively, rely on three basic rationales that appear to conflict with case law discussing the salary theory in other contexts. Both holdings rely on the courts’ observation that the elected officials’ fraudulently-obtained salaries did not cause the paying localities to incur a net monetary loss, because someone would be paid the salaries regardless of who ultimately obtained the positions. Ratcliff, 488 F.3d at 645; Turner, 465 F.3d at 680. 34 But, as the First Circuit has explained, “[Section] 1341 forbids schemes to defraud or to obtain money by false pretenses; this statutory language suggests no requirement that the scheme must be aimed at money which would not otherwise have gone to someone who honestly obtained the victim’s business.” Doherty, 867 F.2d at 60. Other circuit and district courts, applying the mail fraud statute to crimes outside of the election context, have confronted and rejected the rationale relied upon in Ratcliff and Turner as well. See, e.g., id; Sorich, 523 F.3d at 712–13; 34 In United States v. Goodrich, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the government’s attempt to apply the salary theory to a scheme whereby the defendant bribed county officials. 871 F.2d 1011, 1013–14 (11th Cir. 1989). The district court had reasoned that the defendant defrauded the county of salaries paid to officials by bribing them to take certain official actions and conduct “sham meetings.” Id. at 1013. Foreshadowing Turner and Ratcliff, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “the indictment does not allege that the purported mail fraud caused the County to incur any expenses over and above the cost of conducting regularly-scheduled commission business.” Id. at 1013. The Second Circuit expressly declined to opine on the theory’s application to a scheme to bribe previously-elected union officials. United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 237 (2d Cir. 2012). 70