flow of money intended to influence election of candidates for federal office, that is, the Office of President, Vice President, or Member of Congress. 47 Criminal violations of federal campaign financing laws require proof that the conduct was committed “knowingly and willfully.” 48 See United States v. Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d 573, 578– 80 (E.D. Va. 2013). As discussed below, this means that the defendant must know that his or her conduct is unlawful. This standard creates an elevated scienter element requiring, at the very least, that application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear. When there is substantial doubt concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter, the offender is more likely to have an intent defense. Consequently, this chapter will not attempt to cover the entire scope of the federal campaign financing laws. Rather, it will focus on the features of these laws that are welldefined and commonly understood by persons who participate in the modern federal campaign financing process. Violations of state campaign financing laws may, however, suggest the presence of federal corruption offenses. Consideration should be given to whether the alleged conduct may constitute, for example, possible mail, wire, or honest services fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346); extortion under the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951); or federal program bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666). It is also important to note that those who violate state campaign financing laws might also engage in similar schemes at the federal level. 47 48 Violations of these laws that are committed with lesser intent – including all violations committed negligently or because the offender did not understand his or her conduct to be unlawful – are not federal crimes. They are subject to civil and administrative enforcement by the Federal Election Commission. 123