As previously stated, prosecution under FECA’s criminal provision requires proof that the defendant was aware that his or her conduct was generally unlawful. When the conduct is charged under Section 371, however, the proof must also show that the defendant intended to disrupt and impede the lawful functioning of the FEC. Indeed, the crux of a Section 371 FECA case is an intent on the part of the defendant to thwart the FEC. That is a higher factual burden than is required under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and is arguably a greater factual burden than is required by Section 30109(d). The use of Section 371 in this manner has been approved by the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits. United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 562 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1990). (c) Public financing crimes relating to presidential campaigns The anti-fraud provisions of the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042, and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012, are five-year felonies and can be used to prosecute aggravated campaign financing schemes involving presidential campaigns. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9012 and 9042. These statutes were enacted after the Supreme Court struck down the 1974 FECA’s limits on campaign expenditures by federal candidates as violative of free speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The statutes tie eligibility for federal funds to voluntary adherence to campaign expenditure limits by participating candidates. Thus, presidential candidates are given a choice between making unlimited campaign expenditures or accepting public funds for their 163