King v. Whitmer CIVIL 20-13134 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2021) the other side's legal fees . . . is limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely because of the misconduct.” In re Bavelis, 743 Fed.Appx. 670, 675 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S.Ct. 1178, 1183-84 (2017)). In other words, “[t]he complaining party . . . may recover ‘only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for' the misconduct” but courts have “considerable room” to “exercise discretion and judgment” when making this “but for” determination. Id. at 676 (quoting Goodyear Tire, 137 S.Ct. at 1187). Plaintiffs' attorneys contend that the Court cannot rely on its inherent authority because “[t]he comments accompanying Rule 11 indicate that its procedures are controlling when the Court exercises its inherent authority.” (ECF No. 161 at Pg ID 5804.) This argument is misleading. Plaintiffs' counsel first quote the Advisory Committee's 1993 comment to Rule 11: “The power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, but with the condition that this be done through a show cause order.” (Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment)).) But this comment simply explains that the amendment retained the authority for courts to issue sua sponte sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 but with the added requirement of a show cause order. To maintain that the show cause requirement applies to sanctions under a court's inherent authority, Plaintiffs' attorneys quote a second statement in the comments but strategically omit the following key italicized language: “[T]he procedures specified in Rule 11-notice, opportunity to respond, and findings- should ordinarily be employed when imposing a sanction under the court's inherent authority.” (Id. (omitted language added).) Nothing in the comments suggests that the additional procedures in Rule 11 apply when a court sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority or that Rule 11 supplants this authority. In fact, the Advisory Committee's 1993 comment specifically states the opposite: Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper presentations of claims, defenses, or contentions. It does not supplant statutes permitting awards of attorney's fees .... It does not inhibit the court in punishing for contempt, in exercising its inherent powers, or in imposing sanctions, awarding expenses, or directing remedial action authorized under other rules or under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment) (emphasis added). When invoking its inherent authority to sanction, “[a] court must, of course, . . . comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980)). The Sixth Circuit has further explained: The district court must [] afford the parties concerned . . . at least minimal procedural protections, including notice and the opportunity to respond or to be heard. Miranda, 710 F.2d at 522. We do not, in so holding for due process purposes, indicate that there must be a formal ‘complaint' lodged with specifications in the event of a proposed sanction, or that a ‘full fledged' hearing is mandated, but notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard is a minimum protection to be afforded. Ray A. Scharer & Co. v. Plabell Rubber Prod., Inc., 858 F.2d 317, 321 (6th Cir. 1988) (additional internal citations omitted) (discussing due process in context of court's inherent authority); see also Banner v. City of Flint, 99 Fed.Appx. 29, 37 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that, when exercising its inherent authority, a court must “give . . . minimal procedural protections, but no[] formal notice detailing the penalties or a full evidentiary hearing” is required “when the court has sufficient relevant information, including pleadings or materials filed in the record, to decide”); In re Big 19