King v. Whitmer CIVIL 20-13134 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2021) 44 (See ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 878 ¶ 14(C) (advancing this specific allegation but citing no Michigan Election Code provision violated); id. at Pg ID 879 ¶ 15(F) (same); id. at Pg ID 905-06 ¶ 100 (same); id. at Pg ID 943 ¶ 190(k) (same).) In Costantino-which was decided approximately two weeks before Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit-Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Timothy M. Kenny credited the Thomas Affidavit (ECF No. 78-11 at Pg ID 3738-39, 3742, 3745)thereby informing Plaintiffs' counsel that what Gustafson observed did not in fact violate Michigan Election Code, or at a minimum putting counsel on notice that there was a duty to inquire further. And even if Plaintiffs' counsel lacked expertise as to the Michigan Election Code, they undoubtedly were required to be familiar enough with its provisions to confirm that the conduct they asserted violated that code in fact did. The Court finds Plaintiffs' counsel's arguments to the contrary unavailing. First, the attorneys assert that neither opposing counsel nor the Thomas Affidavit took issue with the facts as outlined in the Gustafson Affidavit (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5481-82) and, therefore, the Gustafson Affidavit does not suggest that Plaintiffs' counsel engaged in any conduct worthy of sanctions. This misses the point. The sanctionable conduct is not based on whether the facts described in the Gustafson Affidavit are true or false. What is sanctionable is counsel's allegation that violations of the Michigan Election Code occurred based on those facts, without bothering to figure out if Michigan law actually prohibited the acts described. Second, Plaintiffs' counsel argued that permitting ballots to be handled and transported in the manner described in the Gustafson Affidavit “raises a suspicion” and “[w]hether [such acts are] required under Michigan law or not[] [is] completely irrelevant.” (Id. at Pg ID 5484.) But the Amended Complaint repeatedly asserts that Defendants violated the Michigan Election Code and Plaintiffs' state law, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Electors and Elections Clauses claims are based on these alleged violations. (See, e.g., ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 877, 879, 892, 903, 93748, 953, 955.) And, again, a mere “suspicion” is not enough-this is especially so when neither the litigant nor his or her counsel has bothered to figure out exactly what the law is or what it permits. For the reasons discussed in the three subsections above, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' attorneys presented claims not warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law. 2. Whether Plaintiffs' counsel presented pleadings for which the factual contentions lacked evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, would likely have evidentiary support in violation of Rule 11(b)(3) Before analyzing whether Plaintiffs' counsel violated Rule 11(b)(3), the Court pauses to answer two questions. The sanctionable conduct under Rule 11(b)(3) Plaintiffs' attorneys argue that they genuinely believed the factual allegations in this lawsuit, and otherwise filed this suit and the accompanying documents in good faith. (See ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5415, 5418, 5419, 5492-93, 5501.) They also argue that the affiants genuinely believed the same and submitted their affidavits also in good faith. (Id. at Pg ID 5403.) Because all of this was done in good faith, counsel contends, they should not be sanctioned. Of course, an “empty-head” but “pure-heart” does not justify lodging patently unsupported factual assertions.45 And the good or bad faith nature of actions or submissions is not what determines whether sanctions are warranted under Rule 11(b) (3). What the City claims and the Court agrees is sanctionable as a violation of the rule is the filing of pleadings claiming violations of the Michigan Election Code, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, and Electors and Elections 27