Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515441096 Page: 24 Date Filed: 06/04/2020 No. 20-50407 Take one example. Even though a court must uphold the law if there is any conceivable basis for it, see, e.g., Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019) (per curiam), the district court instead tried to divine Texas’s true intent. Shooting in the dark, the court guessed that Texas wanted to “forc[e] . . . voters to visit polls in-person [sic] during a novel global pandemic, thus jeopardizing their health” and to “fenc[e] out from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they [sic] may vote.” This kind of drive-by speculation about the state’s covert motives is utterly impermissible and finds no support in this record. 42 Instead of searching for a conceivable basis for the rules, the court jerry-rigged some straw men and proceeded to burn them. The district court also forgot that the legislature can “take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute,” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 316, without worrying that a rogue district judge might later accuse it of drawing lines unwisely. 43 Undeterred, the court reasoned that it is absurd for Texas to “fenc[e] out voters under the age of 65” from a mail-in ballot because of frets about fraud “while allowing older voters to u[se] mail ballots,” thereby risking the same “rampant fraud.” The district judge should know that that is not how rational-basis review See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (holding that the legislature need not “actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification”); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“It is, of course, constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision[.]” (quotation marks omitted)). And as observed, supra, it is a grave and malicious accusation for a district judge to make. 42 See Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 685 (2012) (“[T]he Constitution does not require the [state] to draw the perfect line nor even to draw a line superior to some other line it might have drawn. It requires only that the line actually drawn be a rational line.”); Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179 (“Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for [the legislature’s] action, our inquiry is at an end. . . . This is particularly true where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.”); McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809. 43 24

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