24
STAATKUNDIG GEREFORMEERDE PARTIJ v. THE NETHERLANDS DECISION
72. Turning to the present matter, the Court reiterates that the
advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the
member States of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty
reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the
ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention (see,
among other authorities and mutatis mutandis, Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 78, Series A no. 94;
Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, § 67, Series A no. 263;
Burghartz v. Switzerland, 22 February 1994, § 27, Series A no. 280-B;
Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 18 July 1994, § 24, Series A no. 291-B; Van
Raalte v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1997, § 39, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1997-I; Willis v. United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, § 39, ECHR
2002-IV; Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, no. 29865/96, § 53, ECHR 2004-X
(extracts); Zarb Adami v. Malta, no. 17209/02, § 80, ECHR 2006-VIII; and
Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, § 127, ECHR 2012
(extracts)).
73. Moreover, the Court has held that nowadays the advancement of the
equality of the sexes in the member States of the Council of Europe
prevents the State from lending its support to views of the man’s role as
primordial and the woman’s as secondary (see, mutatis mutandis, Ünal
Tekeli, cited above, § 63, and Konstantin Markin, cited above, ibidem).
74. In addition to the case-law cited above, the Court finds the following
Articles relevant to the case:
Article 14
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”
75. No woman has expressed the wish to stand for election as a
candidate for the applicant party. However, the Court does not consider that
decisive.
76. The issue in the present case is the applicant party’s position,
restated in the present proceedings before the Court, that women should not
be allowed to stand for elected office in general representative bodies of the
State on its own lists of candidates. It makes little difference whether or not
the denial of a fundamental political right based solely on gender is stated
explicitly in the applicant party’s bye-laws or in any other of the applicant