LABITA v. ITALY JUDGMENT 33 168. The applicant maintained that he should have been freed immediately after his acquittal. A check could have been performed before the hearing as to whether other grounds for his detention existed, in case he was acquitted. The remaining administrative formalities could have been carried out after his release. 169. The Government pointed out that although a prisoner is considered “free” once his acquittal has been pronounced at a hearing, he cannot be released until certain administrative formalities have been performed, first and foremost being a check to see whether other reasons for detaining him exist. Since it was for the prison authorities to carry out that check on the instructions of the public prosecutor's office, the prisoner had to be brought back to the prison before he could be released. In the instant case, the applicant had had to be taken from Trapani, where the trial took place, to Termini Imerese – a distance of approximately 120 km. As regards the delay caused by the absence of the registration officer, the Minister of Justice had acknowledged in a note to the Commission dated 31 January 1997 that it had been unjustified. Furthermore, the Minister had explained that since March 1996 instructions had been given to the governors of penal institutions so that prisoners could be released at any time, including at night. 170. The Court reiterates that the list of exceptions to the right to liberty secured in Article 5 § 1 is an exhaustive one and only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty (see, among other authorities, the Giulia Manzoni v. Italy judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, p. 1191, § 25, and the Quinn v. France judgment of 22 March 1995, Series A no. 311, pp. 17-18, § 42). 171. While it is true that for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (c) detention ceases to be justified “on the day on which the charge is determined” (see paragraph 147 above) and that, consequently, detention after acquittal is no longer covered by that provision, “some delay in carrying out a decision to release a detainee is often inevitable, although it must be kept to a minimum” (see the Giulia Manzoni judgment cited above, p. 1191, § 25 in fine). 172. The Court observes, however, that in the instant case the delay in the applicant's release was only partly attributable to the need for the relevant administrative formalities to be carried out. The additional delay in releasing the applicant between 12.25 a.m. and the morning of 13 November 1993 was caused by the registration officer's absence. It was only on the latter's return that it was possible to verify whether any other reasons existed for keeping the applicant in detention and to put in hand the other administrative formalities required on release (see paragraph 24 above). 173. In these circumstances, the applicant's continued detention after his return to Termini Imerese Prison did not amount to a first step in the