LESSONS ON THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN ELECTIONS the impact on public trust if these changes cannot be made effectively. The EMB may require time to procure information systems and arrange for access to the source code (in cases where the software is proprietary). This raises the issue of technology service providers, which are usually not a party to proceedings, but their co-operation is required for the EMB to make required changes or provide the required information to the court. 79 This highlights the need for an EMB to retain control of their election process and of the different aspects of the technology so that they can be accountable to the public. The Kenyan Supreme Court also recommended that IEBC ensures restriction of access to its servers to IEBC staff unless where and when it is absolutely necessary to avoid suspicions by stakeholders. 80 The Council of Europe recommended in 2022 that source code should be made public. 81 Again, these cases demonstrate the need for early dialogue and engagement between the EMB and the courts to enhance understanding of these issues. For example, in Kenyan Presidential Petition 1 of 2017, access to the logs of the results management system required the co-operation of the vendor who was not party to the proceedings and was not resident in Kenya. 80 2022 Odinga, at D.b) “To avoid suspicion from stakeholders, unless where and when it is absolutely necessary, access to the servers supporting the transmission and storage of Forms 34A, 34B and 34C should be restricted to IEBC staff during the election period.” 81 Council of Europe, New guidelines on use of technology across all electoral processes, February 2022, paragraph 7(9). 79 27