46
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
sessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the
electoral process.” NRWC, 459 U. S., at 209 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “The governmen
tal interest in preventing both actual corruption and the
appearance of corruption of elected representatives has
long been recognized,” the unanimous Court observed,
“and there is no reason why it may not . . . be accom
plished by treating . . . corporations . . . differently from
individuals.” Id., at 210–211.
The corporate/individual distinction was not questioned
by the Court’s disposition, in 1986, of a challenge to the
expenditure restriction as applied to a distinctive type of
nonprofit corporation. In MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, we stated
again “that ‘the special characteristics of the corporate
structure require particularly careful regulation,’ ” id., at
256 (quoting NRWC, 459 U. S., at 209–210), and again we
acknowledged that the Government has a legitimate
interest in “regulat[ing] the substantial aggregations of
wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with
the corporate form,” 479 U. S., at 257 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Those aggregations can distort the “free
trade in ideas” crucial to candidate elections, ibid., at the
expense of members or shareholders who may disagree
with the object of the expenditures, id., at 260 (internal
quotation marks omitted). What the Court held by a 5-to
4 vote was that a limited class of corporations must be
allowed to use their general treasury funds for independ
ent expenditures, because Congress’ interests in protect
ing shareholders and “restrict[ing] ‘the influence of politi
cal war chests funneled through the corporate form,’ ” id.,
at 257 (quoting FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 501 (1985) (NCPAC)), did
not apply to corporations that were structurally insulated
from those concerns.61
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61 Specifically,
these corporations had to meet three conditions. First,