Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 59 Opinion of STEVENS, J. arise that affect these corporations and organizations.” Id., at 623–624 (citations and footnote omitted). Many of the relationships of dependency found by Judge Kollar-Kotelly seemed to have a quid pro quo basis, but other arrangements were more subtle. Her analysis shows the great difficulty in delimiting the precise scope of the quid pro quo category, as well as the adverse conse­ quences that all such arrangements may have. There are threats of corruption that are far more destructive to a democratic society than the odd bribe. Yet the majority’s understanding of corruption would leave lawmakers impo­ tent to address all but the most discrete abuses. Our “undue influence” cases have allowed the American people to cast a wider net through legislative experiments designed to ensure, to some minimal extent, “that office­ holders will decide issues . . . on the merits or the desires of their constituencies,” and not “according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions”—or expenditures—“valued by the officeholder.” McConnell, 540 U. S., at 153.63 When private interests are seen to exert outsized control over officeholders solely on account of the money spent on (or withheld from) their campaigns, the result can depart so thoroughly “from what is pure or —————— 63 Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 389 (2000) (recognizing “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors”). Though discrete in scope, these experiments must impose some meaningful limits if they are to have a chance at functioning effectively and preserving the public’s trust. “Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influ­ ence is manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize.” McConnell, 540 U. S., at 153. There should be nothing controversial about the proposition that the influence being targeted is “undue.” In a democracy, officeholders should not make public decisions with the aim of placating a financial benefactor, except to the extent that the bene­ factor is seen as representative of a larger constituency or its argu­ ments are seen as especially persuasive.

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